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JONATHAN WEINBERG*
Tracking RFID
Abstract: RFID-Radio Frequency Identification-is a powerful enabling
technology with a wide range of potential applications. Its proponents initially
overhyped its capabilities and business case: RFID deployment is proceeding along a
much slower and less predictable trajectory than was initially thought. Nonetheless,
in the end it is plausible that we will find ourselves moving in the direction of a
world with pervasive RFID: a world in which objects' wireless self-identification
will become much more nearly routine, and networked devices will routinely collect
and process the resulting information.
RFID-equipped goods and documents present privacy threats: they may reveal
information about themselves, and hence about the people carrying them, wirelessly
to people whom the subjects might not have chosen to inform. That information
leakage follows individuals, and reveals how they move through space. Not only
does the profile that RFID technology helps construct contain information about
where the subject is and has been, but RFID signifiers travel with the subject in the
physical world, conveying information to devices that otherwise would not recognize
it and that can take actions based on that information. RFID implementations, thus,
can present three related privacy threats, which this article categorizes as
surveillance, profiling, and action.
RFID privacy consequences will differ in different implementations. It would
be a mistake to conclude that an RFID implementation will pose no meaningful
privacy threat because a tag does not directly store personally identifiable
information, instead containing only a pointer to information contained in a separate
database. Aside from any privacy threats presented by the database proprietor,
.Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I am indebted for the contributions made, when I
first began looking at this topic several years ago, by the participants in the Cyberlaw Summer
Camp sponsored by Harvard Law School's Center for Internet and Society on August 4-8,
2003; the participants in the Conference on Comparative IP and Cyberlaw at the University of
Ottawa on October 4, 2003; and by the organizers of, and the participants in, the Conference
on Securing Privacy in the Internet Age, held at Stanford Law School on March 13, 2004. I
owe special thanks to Jessica Litman and Lee Tien.
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privacy threats from third parties will depend on the extent to which those third
parties can buy, barter, or otherwise gain database access. Where a tag neither points
to nor carries personal identifying information, the extent of the privacy threat will
depend in part on the degree to which data collectors will be able to link tag numbers
with personally identifying information. Yet as profiling accelerates in the modem
world, aided by the automatic, networked collection of information, information
compiled by one data collector will increasingly be available to others as well;
linking persistent identifiers to personally identifying information may turn out to be
easy. Nor are sophisticated access controls and other cryptographic protections a
complete answer to RFID privacy threats. The cost of those protections will make
them impractical for many applications, though, and even with more sophisticated
technology, security problems will remain.
This article suggests appropriate government and regulatory responses to two
important categories of RFID implementation. It concludes with a way of looking at,
and an agenda for further research on, wireless identification technology more
generally.
WEINBERG
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID--Radio Frequency Identification-is best thought of, one
admiring author has suggested, as "some newfangled, infestating,
autoreplicating plague."1  Certainly its use is spreading. The State
Department has incorporated RFID into U.S. passports and other U.S.
government agencies are moving to include it in other government
credentials;2 banks have distributed tens of millions of RFID-enabled
credit cards;3 truck tires incorporating RFID roll down the highway.4
Some suggest that the development of RFID marks the beginning of
the next fundamental transformation in the history of technology.
5
Notwithstanding the power and importance of RFID technology,
though, its proponents initially overhyped its capabilities and failed to
connect that hype with any plausible business case. Efforts to build
RFID into inventory control mechanisms for consumer goods are
slowing6; hardware suppliers are operating at a loss, banking on a
payoff down the road. The Department of Homeland Security has
recently abandoned plans to incorporate RFID into one key
immigration document and declined to order its inclusion in state
driver licenses. 8 Some of the most ambitious ideas that entrepreneurs
and bureaucrats had for RFID a few years ago-the Transportation
Security Agency's notion that RFID-tagged airline boarding passes
could allow security personnel to track all passengers' whereabouts, in
real time, throughout every airport,9 or a private-sector plan for a
1 BRUCE STERLING, SHAPING THINGs 88 (2005).
2 See infra notes 109-23, 133-37 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
5 See STERLING, supra note 1, at 8-14 and 88-95.
6 See infra notes 29-70 and accompanying text.
7 See Raghu Das, Pallet and Case Tagging for Retailers: Q4 Review, IDTEcHEx, Nov. 17,
2006, http://www.idtechex.com/products/en/articies/00000503.asp.
8 See infra notes 124-32, 137-43 and accompanying text.
9 Bob Brewin, TSA Eyes RFID Boarding Passes to Track Airline Passengers,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://www.computerworld.com/newsletter/0,4902,91830,00.html.
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"secure, subdermal RFID . . .payment technology" involving chips
implanted in consumers' triceps areas, enabling them to make
payments by passing a scanner over their arms'-now seem
unrealistic or silly. So while RFID will likely still play a crucial and
even transformative role in technology development, it will do so on a
slower and less predictable trajectory than was initially thought.
RFID deployment-entirely appropriately-has been slowed by
important concerns about privacy. Public-interest groups1' and
academics 12 raised alarms over RFID technology early on. Persons
carrying RFID-enabled goods or documents, they pointed out,
broadcast their tag information to any reader they pass. While REID
tags on tires seem like an effective way of ensuring that the necessary
safety information stays tied to the tire, 13 the possibilities for
surveillance, once a tire rolling down a highway starts broadcasting its
unique ID number, are plain. A wide range of RFID uses have the
potential to jeopardize consumer privacy and threaten civil liberties. 14
In this article, I will examine the trajectory and diffusion-to date,
and in the likely near future-of RFID technology. I will consider
three sets of privacy threats RFID technology can present (categorized
in the paper as the surveillance, profiling, and action threats), and
evaluate the circumstances and classes of REID implementations that
10 See Press Release, Applied Digital Solutions, Applied Digital Solutions' CEO Announces
"VeripayM" Secure, Subdermal Solution for Payment and Credit Transactions at ID World
2003 in Paris (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
Applied+Digital+Solutions'+CEO+Announces+%60%60VeriPay'+Secure,...-a01 10394331
("[O]ne big hurdle remains for RFID systems: security. Lose your RFID-enabled card or
earring, and someone else could easily use it to run up charges .... The subdermal RFID
VeriPay technology specifically addresses the security issue. VeriPay's unique, under-the-skin
format offers a much more secure, tamper-proof, and loss-proof solution.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
11 CASPIAN ET AL., RFID POSITION STATEMENT OF CONSUMER PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
ORGANIZATIONS (Nov. 2003), available at http://privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm
(position statement on RFID issued by eight U.S. public interest groups, including such major
players as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and endorsed by others).
12 See Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 106-07 (2005); see also Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).
13 Cf Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(wrestling with the question of how to ensure that a tire's safety information stays available to
the consumer once the tire is retreaded).
14 See CASPIAN ET AL., supra note 11.
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might present each. I will suggest appropriate government and
regulatory responses to two important categories of RFID
implementation: the inclusion of RFID in government credentials and
the use of RFID-enabled inventory control tags. And I will suggest a
way of looking at, and an agenda for further research on, wireless
identification technology more generally. In the short term, the
concrete privacy threats RFID presents are limited. But in the longer
term, they are substantial: we may be sliding into a world in which
objects' wireless self-identification will become routine, and
networked devices will be in a position routinely to collect and process
the resulting information. We cannot safely ignore the consequences
for privacy.
Section II of the article will explore private-sector deployment of
REID, and Section III will discuss government plans for RFID in
identity or immigration documents. Section IV will analyze the
privacy threats that various RFID implementations may pose, and
Section V will very briefly address why we should care. Section VI
will consider potential government and regulatory responses to today's
threats, and Section VII will look towards the somewhat more distant
future.
II. PRIVATE-SECTOR RFID DEPLOYMENT
Section II of this article explores private-sector deployment of
RFID. It begins with a brief description of RFID technology and the
EPCglobal architecture for passive RFID in the supply chain. It sets
out the progress to date of RFID tagging for inventory control, and
discusses some obstacles to speedy deployment of that technology. It
then discusses a variety of other RFID applications and concludes with
some observations about RFID deployment to date.
The term RFID describes a family of technologies in which (1) a
"tag" contains an integrated circuit storing data that identifies or
describes the tag itself, or the item it is attached to, or the person
carrying it, and (2) the data can be read, wirelessly, by a separate
device called a "reader." The reader, in turn, is part of a system of
networked computers that can take action based on the tag data they
receive. One RFID implementation in common use today is
ExxonMobil's Speedpass technology. The Speedpass wand contains a
code uniquely identifying the particular user. A reader in a gas pump
or gas station cash register, when near the wand, can detect that code
wirelessly. The computer system attached to the reader, armed with
the code, can retrieve the user's credit-card information and complete
a credit-card transaction charging the user's account for the price of
2007-08]
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the gas. For purposes of this article, I will include in the RFID
category both less expensive technology such as Electronic Product
Code ("EPC") Gen2 inventory control tags, 15 and more expensive,
more sophisticated technologies such as ISO 1444316 smart cards.17
The distance at which RFID information can be read is a function
of the particular technology used. Variables include the choice of
operating frequency, the tag design, the reader design, and the level of
external interference. In "passive" tag implementations, where the tag
itself has no internal battery and gets its power from the reader's
signal,' 8 the limiting factors include the size of the tag antenna (and
thus the tag's antenna gain) and the power the tag's integrated circuit
needs in order to operate, as well as the reader's transmission power
(limited by Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") regulation),
its antenna gain (also limited by FCC regulation), and receiver
sensitivity. Plugging in realistic numbers and assuming near-term
technology, inexpensive passive tag systems using the frequency
bands now contemplated appear to have a theoretical maximum
distance of about six meters between tag and reader. 19 Distances
actually achievable in the field for these tags are typically shorter; one
industry expert suggests that a typical operating environment features
15 An EPC inventory control tag is inexpensive, with only minimal computing capability. It is
a passive tag, as described in the next paragraph. On the EPC specification, see infra note 23
and accompanying text.
16 ISO 14443 smart cards incorporate sufficient computing capability to do encryption and
robust access control. For the relevant standards documents, see WG8, Standing Document 1:
WG8 Projects, Nov. 13, 2007, http://wg8.de/sdl.html.
17 Most commentators have taken the same approach. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
DATA PRIVACY & INTEGRITY ADVISORY COMM., REP. No. 2006-02, THE USE OF RFID FOR
HUMAN IDENTITY VERIFICATION 2-3 (Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacyadvcom_12-2006_rptRFID.pdf; Simson
Garfinkel, RFID Payments at ExxonMobil, in RFID: APPLICATIONS, SEC., AND PRIVACY 179
(Simson Garfinkel & Beth Rosenberg eds., 2006). Some vendors of more sophisticated
technologies urge that only simple and unsophisticated implementations should be referred to
as RFID. See, e.g., SMART CARD ALLIANCE, CONTACTLESS SMART CARDS V. EPC GEN 2 RFID
TAGS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (July 2006),
http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/EPC-Gen-2-FAQ_FINAL.pdf.
1s An "active" RFID tag, in contrast, is powered by an internal battery.
19 See RAVI PAPPu, THINGMAGIC LLC, THE PHYSICS OF RFID 19 (2004), available at
http://www.ethionet.et/NR/rdonlyres/Engineering-Systems-Division/ESD-290Spring-
2005/5FE9474C-3365-463A-Bl F5-6E9B252356DA/O/lect6.pdf.
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a read range of three to five meters. Other tags are engineered for
shorter read ranges, but those ranges can vary widely: smart cards
bearing the ISO 14443 chip are designed to operate at a range of two
to four inches, but are vulnerable to attack from considerably farther.21
RFID technology is amenable to a wide range of implementations.
The Auto-ED Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology led a
major technology development and standardization effort aimed at the
use of passive RFID in the retail supply chain. It formally wrapped up
that work in October 2003, but continued its standards efforts under
the EPCGlobal organizational structure. 22  The Auto-ID Center/
EPCGlobal architecture is directed at what was initially RFID's most
commercially important private-sector implementation: inventory
management. The architecture contemplates that each pallet or case of
consumer goods-indeed, each individual retail item-can have
affixed a passive RFID tag holding a globally unique EPC that in turn
points to an entry in a worldwide distributed database called the Object
Name Service. 23The EPC is designed to serve the same function in the
inventory supply chain as a traditional bar code. It extends the bar
code's functionality, though, in two ways.
20 KAREN Guy & SUSANNE BERGLING, FED. TRADE COMM'N, RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS AN FTC WORKSHOP 23-24
(June 21, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/rfid/transcript.pdf [hereinafter FTC RFID
Workshop] (testimony of Daniel Engels, Executive and Research Director, Auto-ID Labs); see
also id. at 247 (testimony of Jim Waldo, Sun Microsystems Laboratories) (urging that even
where cards that have a ten-meter read range in the laboratory, "[o]n the street, you're lucky if
you're going to get a meter or two out of them"); PAPPU, supra note 19, at 35 (testimony of
Manuel Albers, Phillips Semiconductor) (describing six meter read range on inexpensive
cards).
21 See Ilan Kirschenbaum & Avishai Wool, How to Build a Low-Cost, Extended-Range RFID
Skimmer (May 8, 2006), http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/-yash/kw-usenix06/index.html.
22 RFID Journal, Frequently Asked Questions: EPCGlobal and Auto-ID Labs,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/22 (last visited Jan. 13, 2008). EPCGlobal is a joint venture
of EAN International and the Uniform Code Council, which administer the bar code system
today. See id.; see also FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 269-70 (testimony of
Elizabeth Board, EPC Public Policy Action Committee). EPCGlobal continues to develop
RFID standards. See, e.g., Press Release, EPCGlobal, EPCGlobal Inc. Ratifies Electronic
Pedigree Standard (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.epcglobalinc.org/about/mediacentre/
pressrel/epcglobal_prl 1012006_ElectronicPedigree.pdf.
23 See EPCGLOBAL, OBJECT NAMING SERVICE (ONS) VERSION 1.0 (Oct. 4, 2005),
http://www.epcglobalus.org/dnn_epcus/KnowledgeBase/Browse/tabid/277/DMXModule/706/
Command/CoreDownload/Default.aspx?Entryld=299#search=%22ons%201.0%22. The
Object Name Service has a hierarchical structure closely analogous to that of the Internet
domain name system. Indeed, the root of the ONS will be operated by the company, Verisign,
that operates the COM portion of the Internet domain name system.
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First, because readers can detect the EPC wirelessly, tags need not
be scanned manually. The reader does not need a line-of-sight
connection with a tag,24 and can read multiple tags at one time. In
theory, if each widget were tagged with an EPC, one could place a
reader near any of the billion sealed boxes of widgets a retailer
receives each year and instantly know exactly what was inside and
how many of them there were, without unpacking, handling, or manual
scanning. A shelf wired with a reader would always know, in real
time, what it held.
Second, the EPC can uniquely identify each individual item of
merchandise rather than simply identifying a product line. Each tag
can serve as a pointer to a particular database entry, with each database
entry describing a particular television set, automobile transmission or
can of beans.
Starting in 2003, Wal-Mart and several other large retailers began
pushing hard to implement RFID tagging in their supply chains on the
case and pallet level. There was a strong case for implementing RFID
here. The retailers urged that the ability to track cases and pallets
wirelessly and automatically would give them a better picture of where
manufactured items were in the supply chain and how fast it would
take them to get there, enabling them to be more efficient in moving
goods through the distribution 2rocess and making sure those goods
were where they needed to be. Retail industry analysts argued that
6-10% of spending on the supply chain was lost due to lack of
visibility or poor visibility in the supply chain; RFID could address
that.2
7
Wal-Mart, thus, directed its top hundred suppliers that, as of
January 2005, it should be able to read RFID tags on each of the
pallets and cases those suppliers ship to three Wal-Mart distribution
centers. It planned to expand the program to a dozen distribution
24 On the other hand, some barriers, particularly metal and fluid-rich substances such as the
human body, may disrupt the radio signal. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
25 These differences led one prominent senator to call RFIDs "barcodes on steroids." Senator
Patrick Leahy, Remarks at The Dawn of Micro Monitoring: Its Promise and Its Challenges to
Privacy and Security, Conference on "Video Surveillance: Legal and Technological
Challenges," Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 23, 2004),
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200403/032304.html.
26 FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 13-14 (testimony of Sue Hutchinson, Product
Manager, EPCGlobal).
27 Id. at 52-53 (testimony of Britt Wood, Senior Vice President, Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/rfid/wood.pdf.
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centers and up to 600 stores by January 2006.28 The move was
evocative of Wal-Mart's leading role in causing suppliers to adopt old-
fashioned bar codes in the mid-1980s.
The Wal-Mart project hit some snags. By January 2005, progress
was slow. Suppliers were struggling with the technology; read rates
were as low as 60%. Cooperating only because they were compelled
to, suppliers were unwilling to spend more than a small fraction of the
millions of dollars necessary to make the project work smoothly.29
Thus, while more than one hundred suppliers were participating in
Wal-Mart's pilot as of the start of 2005, fewer than half were tagging
all of the pallets and cases they shipped to the three test distribution
centers. Some suppliers put off tagging altogether while they
completely overhauled their IT infrastructure; some were tagging as
little as 2%.30 By March 2006, Wal-Mart had managed to expand the
program to three hundred suppliers, shipping products through five
distribution centers31; it announced that by January 2007 it would
increase participation to six hundred suppliers and additional
distribution centers serving as many as a thousand stores.32 While it
met its thousand-store goal only a few months late, Wal-Mart has
announced that it will delay installing readers in those distribution
centers-so that the RFID-equipped cases and pallets at the distribution
28 FTCRFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 120 (testimony of Simon Langford, Manager of
RFID Strategy, Wal-Mart).
29 See Barnaby J. Feder, Despite Wal-Mart's Edict, Radio Tags Will Take Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2004, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/27/technology/
27rfid.html?ex=1261803600&%2338;en=dc83fdfbd986e222&%2338;ei=5088&.
30 See id.
31 See Mel Duvall, Wal-Mart's Faltering RFID Initiative, BASELINE, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1540,2191749,00.asp; Marc Songini, Wal-Mart
Details Its RFID Journey, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com
/industrytopics/retail/story/0, 10801,109132,00.html. In RFID pilot stores, Wal-Mart has
significantly reduced out-of-stocks and has been able to replenish empty shelves three times
faster. See also RFID Update from Wal-Mart, IDTEcHEx, Oct. 17, 2005,
http://www.idtechex.com/products/en/articles/00000313. asp.
32 See RFID Update from Wal-Mart, supra note 31; see also Jo Best, Wal-Mart Demands
Double RFID Chips with Groceries, CNET NEws.cOM, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Wal-Mart+demands+double+RFID+chips+with+groceries/2 100-
1047_3-6115318.html.
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center will be invisible to it.33  Its suppliers have continued to be
resistant.
34
Around the time of the 2003 Wal-Mart announcement, several
other major retailers-including Target and Albertson's in the United
States, 35 and Tesco and Metro in Europe-announced similar plans.
36
None have been without difficulties. Target began a slow rollout in
2005, working with 100 suppliers.37 Albertson's did the same
(although a purchase of 5000 RFID readers, announced in 2006,
suggested a plan to ramp up deployment).38 European retailing giant
Metro announced in 2004 an RFID rollout that, it planned, would by
December 2005 include 100 suppliers, 269 stores, and eight
distribution centers.39 It did not go that quickly; by the summer of
2006, about forty of its suppliers were placing tags on pallets.41 Metro
31 See Marc L. Songini, Wal-Mart Shifts RFID Plans, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=284
11 5&intsrc=news ts head.
34 See Evan Schuman, The RFID Hype Effect, EWEEK.COM, Feb. 27, 2006,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1931978,00.asp.
35 FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 224 (testimony of Chris Boone, Program Manager,
IDC); Josh McHugh, Attention, Shoppers: You Can Now Speed Straight through Checkout
Lines!, WIRED, July 2004, at 151, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/12.07/shoppers.html. Other large retailers seemed ready to follow suit. See
Jacqueline Emigh, More Retailers Mull RFID Mandates, EWEEK.COM, Aug. 19, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1637597,00.asp ("all of the top 25 retailers have RFID
initiatives either in place or under consideration").
36 Wal-Mart's push, and the continuing buzz over RFID in the marketplace, caused a
substantial number of corporate IT departments to begin or consider RFID pilots, even without
any obvious way to get return on that investment; they feared they would be left behind if they
did not.
37 Laurie Sullivan, Target and Suppliers Using RFID, Sources Say, INFORMATIONWEEK, June
8, 2005, http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=164301344.
38 Wal-Mart to Buy 15k RFID Readers; Albertsons 5k, RFID UPDATE, Apr. 18, 2006,
http://www.rfidupdate.com/articles/index.php?id = 1097.
39 Jo Best, Retailer to Follow RFID Test with Full Rollout, ZDNET AsIA, Sept. 3, 2004,
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/hardware/0,39042972,39192342,00.htm.
40 Metro's Suppliers Face Deadline on Updated RFID Standard, FOOD PRODUCTION DAILY,
June 15, 2006, http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/news/ng.asp?id=68458-metro-rfid-epc;
John Blau, RFID on All Goods 15 Years Off, Says Retail Giant, INFOWORLD, Mar. 8, 2006,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/03/08/76222_liNrfidadoptionl .html?RADIO%2OFRE
QUENCY%201DENTIFICATION%20-%20RFID.
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attributed a significant part of the delay to the rollout of an updated
Gen2 version of the tag specifications and announced that it was
looking towards beginning case-level tagging by the end of 2006; as of
September 2006, though, it still had only 22 stores participating in its
case-level tagging program.
41
Case and pallet level tagging has so far not lived up to its advance
publicity. Key to the deployment problem is the fact that the benefits
of RFID tagging in this context accrue to retailers, but the costs are
borne by suppliers.42 This led to "slap and ship" tagging as suppliers
made the minimum changes necessary to comply with Wal-Mart
mandates, and other retailers held back to see whether Wal-Mart and
other early adopters succeeded.43 The pallet/case market, thus, was
"the nearest thing to a black hole" in the RFID market in 2006; RFID
hardware suppliers sold tags and readers at substantial losses, and
consumer packaged goods companies did their best to avoid even
those costs. 44  It seems clear by now that Wal-Mart's initial
expectations for quick adoption were unrealistic. 45  Tagging in the
41 Evan Schuman, Metro Group Divorcing Grocery Scan from Payment, EWEEK.COM, Sept.
13, 2006, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2015462,00.asp. In Great Britain,
supermarket chain Tesco announced ambitious plans in 2003 for case-and-pallet level RFID in
its supply chain. See Jo Best, Tesco Takes RFID into All Extra Superstores, SILIcoN.coM,
Sept. 30, 2004, http://networks.silicon.com/lans/0,39024663,39124558,00.htm. It ended up
modifying those plans substantially. Struggling with too-long tag read times and restrictive
EU spectrum-management regulation, see RFID Update from Tesco, IDTEcHEx, Oct. 4,2005,
http://www.idtechex.com/products/en/articles/00000296.asp, it shifted away from placing
disposable tags on shipping trays and pallets to a new plan locating permanent tags on the
cages and trollies used to deliver goods from distribution centers to stores. See Andy McCue,
Tesco to Track Milk Deliveries by RFID, CNET NEWS.COM, June 1, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Tesco+to+track+milk+deliveries+by+RFID/2100-1033_3-
6079022.html; Jonathan Collins, Tesco Revises RFID Plans, RFID J., Apr. 7, 2006,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2243.
42 See Jonathan Katz, Making RFID Work, INDUSTRYWEEK, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=11347. Another obstacle in
Europe stemmed from restrictive spectrum-management rules. See Mark Roberti, New ETSI
RFID Rules Move Forward, RFID J., Nov. 9, 2004, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/
articleview/1229/1/1; RFID Update From Tesco, supra note 41.
43 Larry Dignan, Suppliers Push Back at RFID Demands, BASELINE, Aug. 31, 2005,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mizdcis/is 200508/ai n15325218/print; John R.
Johnson, The Case of the Missing Mandates, DC VELOCITY, July 2005,
http://www.dcvelocity.com/viewpoints/?article-id=559; Feder, supra note 29.
4Das, supra note 7.
41 See Schuman, supra note 34.
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inventory chain is a complex enterprise and lacks agreed-upon
standards and sufficiently advanced software support. All of these
problems are solvable with time, though, and industry analysts seem to
agree that, in the end, RFID's benefits for the inventory process will
make case-and-pallet deployment inevitable. 46
What about other uses for RFID? The initial buzz over RFID in
the inventory process was not limited to the case and pallet level. A
variety of companies engaged in item-level testing of tags on a broad
range of consumer goods; that is, their trials involved the placement of
RFID tags on individual consumer items. Gillette (which announced
in early 2003 that it would purchase 500 million RFID tags) 47 worked
with retailers to test "smart shelves," as an adjunct to item-level
tagging, for inventory control. With a reader on each shelf and a tag
on each package of razor blades, it reasoned, the data proprietor would
always know how many packages were on the shelves, without having
to count them. Benetton made plans early to put RFID in individual
items of clothing, but pulled back after a publicity firestorm;
consumers expressed alarm about the prospect of walking around with
their shirts speaking silently and wirelessly to networked computing
devices in their paths.
48
Other companies were less deterred. Marks & Spencer conducted
initial trials of item-level RFID tags in menswear, and more recently,
trials in connection with other items, including women's underwear; it
appears committed to testing item-level RFID as a stock control
system. 9 Levi's conducted a small pilot in which certain of its men's
jeans sold at a single (undisclosed) U.S. store carried external RFID
hang tags.50 Gap and Abercrombie also conducted small pilots.
51
46 See id.
47 David M. Ewalt, Gillette Orders 500 Million RFID Tags, INFORMATiONWEEK, Jan. 6, 2003,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20030106S0007.
48 Benetton Explains RFID Privacy Flap, RFID J., June 23, 2003,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/view/471/1/1.
49 FTCRFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 265-68 (testimony of James Stafford, Head of
RFID, Marks & Spencer); Bert Moore, RFID: Invading Women's Underwear?, AIM GLOBAL,
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.aimglobal.org/members/news/templates/
template.aspx?articleid=84 1 &zoneid=24. Marks & Spencer also deployed three and a half
million RFID tags on its returnable food trays, which cycle between the store and its food
suppliers. FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 263-64.
50 Press Release, CASPIAN, Spychipped Levi's Brand Jeans Hit the U.S. (Apr. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.spychips.com/press-releases/levis-secret-testing.html.
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Yet few of these pilots seem to be going anywhere. Neither Gap
nor Abercrombie, their pilots over and done with, seem to be investing52
in RFID tagging. Gillette is focusing its own current efforts on
investigating the taging of cases, pallets, and promotional displays,
not individual items. While some new trials are taking place,5 they
do not seem to add up to a robust trend favoring increased item-level
roll-out.
55
There was reason, as far back as 2004, to doubt the business case
for item-level tagging. To begin with, it was not clear whether the cost
of RFID tags would drop sufficiently. It is hard to imagine widespread
distribution of item-level tags unless the price per tag drops below five
cents and harder to imagine tags on really cheap consumer items-say,
boxes of cereal and bars of soap-unless the price per tag drops to
below a penny.56 But the cost of even the least expensive tag in 2004
was more than ten cents by some accounts and forty cents by others.
57
As one analyst explained the problem:
51 See Jonathan Collins, RFID Implementation is an Art, RFID J., June 14, 2006,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/2427/1/1.
52 See id.
53 See Mary Catherine O'Connor, Gillette Fuses RFID with Product Launch, RFID J., Mar. 27,
2006, http://www.rfidj ournal.com/article/articleprint/2222/-1/1.
54 See, e.g., Marc Songini, Dutch Bookseller Unveils Item-Level RFID System,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2006/
0,4814,110858,00.html.
5 5 But see LOGICACMG & GS 1, EUROPEAN PASSIVE RFID MARKET SIZING 2007-2022, at 2
(Feb. 2007), http://www.logicacmg.com/file/7468 (urging that "RFID is still poised for
significant growth in Europe" with most of that growth in the short term coming from item-
level tagging of high-value items).
56 Progress with Item-Level RFID Special Report, THE IDTECH WEB J., Feb. 2004, at 5,
available at http://www.idtechex.com/pdfs/en/L6931K9077.pdf [hereinafter Progress with
Item-Level RFID Special Report]. (To make a tag for less than a penny, you would want to
print RFID circuits and memory on conventional multi-station printing presses, along with the
regular product packaging, using layers of conductive and non-conductive inks. There are
now signs of movement in that direction but it is still a long way away.); see Raghu Das,
Chipless RFID-The End Game, IDTECHEx, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.idtechex.com/
products/en/articles/00000435.asp.
57 See ALLEN FRIEDMAN, PREDICTIONS AMID THE HYPE: ASSESSING THE RISKS OF RETAIL RFID
AND PRIVACY 7-8 (2004), http://www.sccs.swarthnore.edu/users/02/allan/
RFID PrivacyHype.doc; see also FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 57 (testimony of
Britt Wood, Senior Vice President, Retail Industry Leaders Association) (estimating a cost of
twenty to forty cents per tag).
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The first challenge is cost reduction, the damned things cost
too much. And the next three or four iterations of Moore's
Law on this is going to be cost reduction. And then the next
problem is that they still cost too much, because the antennas
cost too much. And beyond that, there's a real problem in
getting the chip-antenna bonding to work ight... as you
make these chips smaller and smaller and you try to attach
them to the antenna... [Y]ou know what happens when it's
hard to attach these things? They cost too much.5
The cost numbers have been recalcitrant. As one company's CIO put
it more recently: "The costs of tags are 40 cents, and it is 10 cents to
put them on. But we're not getting a 50 cent return. If we're lucky,
we get 7 cents."
59
It is possible that tag costs may yet come down substantially. Not
too long ago, an Israeli company announced that it would sell tags in
volumes of 100 million or more for as little as five cents. It
sidestepoed questions of whether the offer was, in essence, a loss
leader. Even with inexpensive tags, though, taking advantage of
item-level tagging will require retailers to incur the costs of purchasing
and installing reader networks, training reader operators, and putting in
place back-end data systems to manage the information. Some
observers estimate that hardware costs for RFID will amount to only
3% of the total with software to process the huge amounts of data
generated by the network making up 75%.61 The hardware and
software costs associated with large-scale implementation of systems
such as smart shelves, which feature large numbers of readers and
terabytes of data per day, may be prohibitive.
62
58 FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 249 (testimony of Jim Waldo, Sun Microsystems).
59 Larry Dignan, Suppliers Push Back at RFID Demands, BASELINE, Aug. 31, 2005,
http://www.baselinemag.com/printarticle2/0,1217,a=1 59259, 0 0 .asp.
6 Mark Roberti, SmartCode Offers 5-Cent EPC Tags, RFID J., May 1, 2006,
www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/2296.
61 See FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 57-58 (testimony of Britt Wood, Senior Vice
President, Retail Industry Leaders Association); see also Danny Bradbury, Extending the
Enterprise: RFID: It's No Supply Chain Saviour -Not Yet Anyway, SILIcON.coM, Sept. 8,
2004, http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/enterprise/
0,3800003425,39123656,00.htm.
62 See FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 250 (testimony of Jim Waldo, Sun
Microsystems).
(Vol. 3:3
WEINBERG
Item-level RFID is desirable for inventory control only to the
extent it can generate useful information more quickly and cheaply
than can currently available technologies such as bar-code scanning.'
If item-level tagging is to justify its costs, it will have to be markedly
more convenient and more reliable than lower-tech approaches. But
there is room for doubt on that score, at least when it comes to low-
value items. Early adopters wrestled with the fact that RFID tags are
subject to considerable interference from items in the retail
environment, such as fluids and metal,64 not to mention nylon
conveyor belts and dense materials like frozen meat and chicken
parts. Even in environments that could be optimized for RFID, such
as distribution centers receiving arriving pallets readers were
sometimes unable to read more than 80% of the tags.6a In the words of
one industry analyst: "Every site's a little different. You can't just
throw up antennae; there's a tuning aspect. This is dirty fingernail
stuff. '67 It is more difficult still to get satisfactory read rates for RFID
63 For an excellent early analysis of RFID costs, concluding that "the economic benefits of
item-level tagging appear to be exaggerated or hyped by proponents of RFID technology," see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 9-15. For a similar thought from another angle, here is a poll
question reproduced from Frontline magazine:
One of the first areas of RFID adoption in the supply chain will be at the pallet or
unit-load level. Based on your own operations, where on the unit load would it make the
most sense to place the RFID tag?
* On the pallet or conveyance itself.
" On the stretch wrap.
* On the last carton on the pallet.
" On my application for unemployment when our RFID project goes over budget
available at http://www.clearorbit.com/files/FrontlineSolutionsVoltek.pdf (the poll question is
in the right hand margin of the document).
64 Progress with Item-Level RFID Special Report, supra note 56, at 7. Other frequency bands,
moreover, present their own problems. Id.
65 See David Margulius, The Rush to RFID, INFOWORLD, Apr. 9, 2004, at 38, available at
http://www.infoworld.com/pdf/specialreport/2004/15SRrfld.pdf; see also FRIEDMAN, supra
note 57, at 6-7.
66 Margulius, supra note 65, at 38.
67 Id (quoting Tig Gilliam, partner, IBM Business Consulting Services). In David Freeman
Hawke's Nuts and Bolts of the Past: A History ofAmerican Technology, 1776-1860 (1988),
the "men with dirty fingernails" were inventors and mechanics at home on the shop floor,
going from one machine to the next, comfortable with tightening enough bolts here and
replacing enough gears there to make their inventions work. So too here.
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tags on the retail store floor, which cannot be optimized for RFID
readers the way a distribution center can. While current reports
indicate better read rates with tags conforming to the new Gen2
specification, the problem is still substantial.
All this suggests that there are major obstacles in the way of the
industry's dream of "put[ting] a radio frequency ID tag on everything
that moves in the North American supply chain." 69 Some executives
predict that we will see mass adoption of RFID on the item level, but
not until the 2020s or later. 70 With a time frame twenty years or more
in the future, though, no prediction is reliable.
What about other uses of RFID? Manufacturers and service
providers have chosen to deploy RFID in a wide range of more
specialized applications. Michelin, for example, began fleet testing
RFEID in tires in 2003. Each tire's unique identification number, in
EPC format, is associated in an external database with the Vehicle
Identification Number ("VIN") of the car on which it is mounted, and
with information describing when and where the tire was made, its
maximum inflation pressure, its size, and so on.7 1 The tags are too
expensive for passenger-car use, but are in production now for
airplanes and fleet trucks. 72  Tire-industry engineers are developing
68 See Ross STAPLETON-GRAY, SCANNING THE HORIZON: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF RFIDs ON THE
SHELVES (2003), http://www.stapleton-gray.com/papers/sk-20031113.pdf. Stapleton-Gray
also notes disadvantages of RFID for retailers in terms of competitive marketing
considerations and vulnerability to corporate espionage and counterfeit tags. At the very least,
these concerns may push retailers towards closed systems and away from the relatively open
Object Name Space.
69 Lori Valigra, SmartTags: Shopping Will Never be the Same, CRSTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, Mar.
29, 2001 (quoting Steven Van Fleet, program director, International Paper), quoted in
Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards. The Tip of the Retail Surveillance Iceberg, 79 DENV.
U.L. REv. 534, 561 n.163 (2002).
70 See Blau, supra note 40; see also FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 60 (testimony of
Britt Wood, Retail Industry Leaders Association, stating that significant item-level tagging is
unlikely within the next ten years); id. at 59 (suggesting that it will be 2017 before we see
item-level tagging on products cheaper than ten dollars); id. at 109 ("the economics behind
item-level just don't make sense right now for retailers to implement.").
71 See John Johnson, Where the Rubber Meets the Road, DC VELOCITY, May 2006,
http://www.dcvelocity.com/viewpoints/?articleid=215; Laurie Sullivan, Michelin Expands
RFID Tests, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 12, 2004,
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=49901180;
Michelin Introduces Radio Frequency Tire Identification Technology, MOTOR TREND, Jan. 16,
2003, http://www.motortrend.com/features/news/1 12_news0l 1603_tire.
72 See Johnson, supra note 71.
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specifications to combine that functionality with sensors monitoring
temperature and pressure.
73
A variety of automobile manufacturers incorporate RFID into the
ignition key, so that the key can identify itself to the anti-theft
system.74 So far, indeed, transportation-related uses-also including
cards and tickets for busses and trains-have accounted for more than
40% of the 2.4 billion RFID tags that one source estimates have been
sold to date.
75
RFID tags have been extensively deployed in library books, raising
concerns about tracking and surveilling individuals via their First
Amendment activity. 76  They are used to track livestock and pets:
more than 50 million pets have RFID tags. 77 Indeed, any technology
that keeps track of pets works for children as well; schools have used
RFID-equipped identification badges, schoolbooks and clothing to
track elementary and middle school students.78
Access cards, and other uses relating to financial, security, and
safety applications, account for another 25-30% of tags sold to date.
Banks have issued tens of millions of RFID-equipped credit cards; you
can find RFID credit-card readers in CVS pharmacies, McDonald's
restaurants and some movie theaters.79 The advantage of RFID here is
73 See Sullivan, supra note 71.
74 See FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 16-17 (testimony of Dr. Daniel Engels,
Executive and Research Director, Auto-ID Labs) (Ford); Id. at 68 (testimony of William
Allen, Marketing Communications Manager, Texas Instruments RFID Systems) (Jeep,
Chrysler, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Lexus).
75 See RAGHU DAS & DR. PETER HARROP, RFID FORECASTS, PLAYERS & OPPORTUNITIES 2006-
2016, at 20, http://www.idtechex.com/pdfs/en/P1637T193 1.pdf.
76 See Alorie Gilbert, RFID, Coming to a Library Near You, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 18, 2004,
http://news.com.com/RFID,+coming+to+a+library+near+you/2100-1012_3-5411657.html.
77 Cathy Booth-Thomas, The See-It-All Chip, TIME, Sept. 14, 2003,
http://www.time.com/time/globalbusiness/article/0,9171,1101030922-485764,00.html.
78 See Nicole A. Ozer, Rights "Chipped" Away: RFID and Identification Documents (Jan.
2007), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/2007/01/rfid technology.html; Jo Best, Japan
Schoolkids to be Tagged with RFID Chips, ZDNET NEWS, July 12, 2004,
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/hardware/0,39042972,39186467,00.htm.
79 See John Schwartz, Researchers See Privacy Perils in No-Swipe Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2006, at Cl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/23/business/23card.html?ei=5070&en=d51440266e3f7c33
&ex=1 173844800; JIMMY ATKINSON, CONTACTLESS CREDIT CARDS CONSUMER REPORT 2006
(2006), available at http://www.findcreditcards.org/reports/contactlessreport.pdf.
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that the user need not swipe her card through a reader; it is sufficient to
bring it into the reader's general vicinity. The danger, of course, is
that unauthorized readers may be able to pull information from the
card as well. °
It is possible to imagine a whole lot of uses for a technology in
which objects can be uniquely identified without direct contact. If you
wanted the milk in your refrigerator to notify you (or your
supermarket) if you failed to drink it by its pull date, REID technology
would be a good way to go.81  Indeed, you could tie a slightly more
elaborate tag to a nanosensor that checked for spoilage directly.
In the "Way Cool" department, Mattel has introduced a collectible
card game called Hyperscan in which the cards bear RFID tags;
players, after swiping the cards over the base unit, compete against
each other in onscreen games in which their avatars wield the cards
they have just swiped. After the battle, the base unit writes new
information to the tags on the winner's cards, to make them more
powerful in the next battle.
8 3
A recent summary from REID consultant (and evangelist)
IDTechEx illustrates the breadth of current and potential uses:
80 It appears, indeed, that data security architecture on many credit cards today is surprisingly
bad. See Schwartz, supra note 79.
81 Compare Vint Cerf, Growing Up in a Digital World, Address Given at the Global Internet
Summit 2000 (Aug. 7, 2000), http://www.govtech.com/gt/2191 (imagining the Internet-
equipped refrigerator, but assuming that one would manually scan a milk carton's bar code
when putting it in the fridge), with John C. Dvorak, Smart Homes, Dumb Ideas, PC MAG.,
June 26, 2000, http://www.shed.com/digests/digests2000/O6-30-OO.txt.
82 See Jack Uldrich, Now You See It... , ADVANTAGE, Feb. 2004, (describing use of
nanotechnology to detect milk spoilage).
83 Seth Schiesel, It's a Game, It's a Toy, It's Mattel's Big Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006,
at El. A list of actual or proposed uses for RFID, indeed, could go on at some length. A plan
to keep tabs on the elderly envisions placing RFID tags on objects in the subjects' homes, and
networked readers on their persons, to keep track of their handling the tagged items. See Mark
Baard, RFID Keeps Track of Seniors, WIRED, Mar. 19, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,62723,00.html. Casinos have put RFID tags in
chips to block counterfeiting, identify stolen chips, and track gamblers' play. An Italian
manufacturer introduced a washing machine equipped to read RFID washing instruction tags
in clothing. See Merloni Unveils RFID Appliances, RFID J., Apr. 4, 2003,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/369/l/l/. A German supermarket, for a brief
time, inserted RFID tags in supermarket loyalty cards-which gave the store the capability,
while someone carrying the loyalty card was in the store, to pull up his entire buying history
without his being aware that the query was taking place and without any other basis for the
store's knowing who he was. It abandoned the experiment after consumer outcry.
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RFID is monitoring the post in Algeria and Bosnia-
Herzegovina and is being used in the Philippines in the form
of Stored Value Cards to replace cash and reduce queues.
Road tolling is a use in Slovakia. For proof of ownership it is
on reindeer in Lapland. In precious wild plants in New
Zealand, it has led to arrests under conservation orders.
RFID tags on prepared sushi meals in Japan permit the staff
to automate payment and stocktaking but in Antarctica it has
enabled research on the behaviour of penguins. In Thailand,
they like to put RFID on chickens for disease control and
they use it in cock fighting. In South Africa, RFID tracks
ore but in Turkey they encounter it as a loyalty card.
In Canada, they have been tracking food trolleys in
their aircraft but Italy has RFID on intelligent mooring buoys
in marinas giving personalised promotional messages when
you tie up. Australia tags boats for theft prevention. The
Australians tag racehorses by law but the Canadians tag fish
for conservation. In the UK RFID has been used to research
the behaviour of insects including butterflies and IDTechEx
has several studies of the tagging of elk but not in China,
where pandas are the centre of attention.
RFID is the basis of an automated tour of a museum
in Korea and it prevents theft in art galleries in France - an
improvement on the crude performance of the traditional
anti-theft tag in shops and libraries, which is not RFID.
[Implementations range flrom casino chips in the USA to a
multifunctional bank card in Azerbaijan, national
identification cards in Estonia, China and Oman, weapons
permits in Honduras, laptop theft revention in Brazil and
police evidence bags in the UK ....
There has been a move underway for some time in the
pharmaceutical industry to tag shipments of drugs to pharmacies with
unique serial numbers on RFID tags. That unique identifier could tie
each package to its complete manufacturing and dispensing history, as
a guarantee that the drug was what its package held it out to be and
84 Dr. Peter Harrop, RFID Exotica, IDTECHEx, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.idtechex.com/
products/en/articles/00000499.asp.
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was being sold in authorized channels.8 5  This move was driven
heavily by federal and state requirements that medications have a
chain-of-custody pedigree showing, from the time a medication left the
factory, which entity held it, for how long, and who the entity passed it
to. RFD initially was seen as a natural way (though not the only way)
for drug manufacturers to achieve good chain-of-custody pedigrees.
Recently, though, the FDA has noted substantial obstacles to the use of
RFID to identify medication packages, including concerns about
privacy, the security of confidential business transaction data, the
accuracy and speed of RFID reader systems, and the effect of RFID on
sensitive products.8 6 Only a small number of high-value and heavily
counterfeited medications, such as Viagra, are likely to see extensive
RFID tagging in the near future.87
One of the most eye-catching proposed uses for RFID relates to
implanting tags into people subcutaneously. A Spanish nightclub, two
years ago, went ahead and injected RFID tags into some of its
customers, who thereby got free access to the club's VIP area.8 8 As
the club owner explained: "You won't have to carry a wallet. By
simply passing by our reader, the Baja Beach Club will know who you
are and what your credit balance is."8 9  Mexico's attorney general,
about the same time, announced that he and 160 members of his staff
had been equipped with chips implanted in their arms, to authenticate
their access to secure office areas and to enable them to be found
85 See U.S. FDA, COMBATING COUNTERFEIT DRUGS: A REPORT OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § D. .e (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/
initiatives/counterfeit/report02_04.html#radiofrequency.
86 See U.S. FDA, FDA COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE REPORT: 2006 UPDATE § IV.B (2006),
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/ counterfeit/report6_06.html.
87 See US Legislation Slows Pharma RFID Tracking, CXOTODAY.COM, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.cxotoday.com/cxo/j sp/article.jsp?articleid=71218&cat-id=91 1.
88 See Press Release, Infowars, Applications Continue to Grow for Applied Digital Solutions'
VeriPay: Baja Beach Club in Barcelona, Spain Employs RFID Technology for Cashless
Payment System (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.infowars.com/print/bb/
bajaimplantupdate.htm.
89 The Spanish-language text ("No hace falta llevar monedero. Con s6lo pasar por nuestro
lector, Baja Beach Club conoceri quidn es, y de qui saldo dispone.") no longer appears on the
club's website. Another copy of the Spanish text, and an English translation, can be found at
http://www.infowars.com/print/bb/bajaimplant.htm. While not all content on the Infowars site
is reliable, the translation appears accurate.
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"anywhere inside Mexico" in the event of assault or kidnapping. 90
This was, well, silly, and more than a little curious; how a chip with a
read range of a few inches would allow the wearer to be found
anywhere in the country was left unexplained. 91
More recently, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
approved the implantation into human subjects of RFID tags
referencing the subjects' medical records. 92  According to the
manufacturer, about sixty people so far have agreed to be chipped.93 A
Cincinnati company implanted chips in two workers to test the use of
implanted chips for secure-area access. 9 4
It is hard to read about chipping live human beings with
equanimity. Yet actual instances of human implantation have been
unserious, isolated, or hypothetical. 95 We can expect tremendous
market resistance to any initiative calling for the implantation of RFID
tags in live people.
Indeed, RFID deployment to date presents something of a paradox.
On the one hand, RFID is in many ways a tremendously powerful
enabling technology, with a wide range of potential applications (many
" See Mexican Officials Get Chipped, WIRED, July 13, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0, 1282,64194,00.html; Press Release, CASPIAN,
Mexican Government Promotes Myth of RFID Security (July 19, 2004),
http://spychips.com/press-releases/mexican-implants.html; Monica Campbell, Law
Enforcement in Mexico Goes a Bit Bionic, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2004,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0804/p0lsO4-woam.html.
91 The manufacturer's Mexican distributor had earlier announced plans to implant RFID tags
in children as an anti-kidnapping device; searchers would place readers in "strategic locations
where a search is being conducted," as well as malls, bus stations, and similar locations. See
Julia Scheeres, Tracking Junior with a Microchip, WIRED, Oct. 10, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0, 1282,60771,00.html.
92 Barnaby J. Feder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Chip Planted Under Skin Approved for Use in
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/1/14/technology/14implant.html.
93 Press Release, Spychips.com, RFID Implants: Fine for Thee, But Not for Me (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.spychips-com/press-releases/verichip-thompson-no-implant.html.
94 Associated Press, A First in U.S.: Chipped Beef, WIRED, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70217-0.html.
951 include in this category the Verichip Corporation's lobbying for mandatory chips in the
bodies of foreign guest workers, to be used "at the border ... [and] for enforcement purposes
at the employer level." Fox & Friends interview with Scott Silverman, Chairman of the Board
of VeriChip Corporation (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.spychips.com/press-
releases/silverman-foxnews.html.
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of them, like livestock tagging, presenting no interesting privacy
issues). On the other hand, in the United States at least, the highest-
volume applications have not yet generated a business case suggesting
the sort of return on investment that would make the project
worthwhile. This is most notably true in the context of inventory
control. Focus on RFID hardware--on tags and readers-has led to a
heavily populated hardware supplier sector, in which suppliers,
bleeding cash, do their best to differentiate themselves, while
prospective buyers are holdin& back, unconvinced that RFID can
actually make money for them.6 The complexity and costliness of
deployment, as well as the entrenched nature of existing bar-code-
based tracking systems, have left many firms unenthusiastic about
adopting the technology.97
If we step away from current technology and short-term business
models, we may get a different view of the technology's potential.
Looking far to the future, author Bruce Sterling has argued that RFIDs
are the forerunners of profound, irreversible technological
transformation, comparable to the Industrial Revolution in both social
upheaval and the technological advances it will bring." Sterling
foresees a world shot through with RFIDs and networked sensors, all
generating information, all leaving information trails and
microhistories of the objects to which they are attached. That sort of
information, he continues, will be necessary if society is to know
enough about itself, and to exert enough control over its physical
circumstances, to survive.99 The society of the future, he urges, will
rely on having detailed digital representations of objects and their
environments, enabled and enriched by the information these sensors
bring, in order for its members to better understand it, to design it, and
to design for it (in part through effortless fabrication from digital
models).'00
96 Sandra Gittlen, The Failure ofRFID, COMPUTERWORLD, June 15, 2006,
http://cwflyris.computerworld.com/t/601111/1423078/22956/0.
97 John S. Webster, Forecast 2006: RFID, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 2, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/management/story/0, 10801,107308,00.ht
ml?source=NLTEB&nid=l 07308.
98 See STERLING, supra note 1, at 8-14, 85-94.
99 See id. at 45-47, 97-101.
'0o See id. at 102-05.
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The transformation, he acknowledges, will have downsides. "In
engaging with a technology so entirely friendly toward surveillance,
spying, privacy invasion and ruthless technical intrusion on previously
unsoiled social spaces, we are playing with fire."10' But, he continues,
we do not banish fire from society because of its dangers; rather than
engaging in "fatalistic handwringing" when it comes to "technology's
grim externalities and potentials for deliberate abuse," the answer lies
in "design thinking and design action."' 10 2 I have a variety of
difficulties with Sterling's vision, all best left to a paper other than this
one, but my objections do not detract from his basic point that
networked sensors can provide incredibly important information, and
provide the basis for technological innovation-and RFIDs, in
important ways, are just a special case of networked sensors.
III. RFID AND GOVERNMENT IDENTITY DOCUMENTS
One enthusiastic and growing RFID market is the government.
Governments are not constrained by the need for adequate return on
investment and not all of the issues slowing down business take-up are
relevant in the government context. Section Three of this article
explores government deployment of RFID technology. After a brief
overview, it first discusses, and criticizes, the government's initiative
to embed RFID in passports. It then examines the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to incorporate RFID technology into two
sets of travel documents: the PASS travel document for people
traveling between the U.S. and Canada and the 1-94 that all temporary
visitors to the U.S. must carry. It concludes by describing initiatives to
embed RFID in a variety of other government identification
documents.
To date, thirteen agencies of the U.S. government have
implemented, or plan to implement, a specific RFID deployment
plan.10 3  Some of those straightforwardly relate to logistics support,
1' Id. at 12-13.
"' Id. at 13.
103 GAO, INFORMATION SECURITY: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05551.pdf. In response to
a GAO questionnaire, only one of the thirteen agencies answered that it believed there were
legal issues associated with RFID use, and only six responded that they were concerned with
security issues.
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tracking the movement of shipments or other materials. 10 4 Others are
less innocuous from a privacy perspective: the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") and the Treasury Department plan to
use RFID for physical access control, and the Department of
Transportation for "screening." The State Department has already
begun issuing passports equipped with RFID, and the Department of
Homeland Security intends to use RFID-equipped documents for
border control. The General Services Administration ("GSA") is
procuring government ID cards that identify themselves wirelessly 10 5
(although GSA, alert to the public-relations implications of its labels,
insists that because these contactless cards encrypt communications
from tag to reader, they are not RFID). 106
An initial key adopter of RFID for the logistics chain was the U.S.
Department of Defense ("DoD"), which announced in 2004 that it
would require all suppliers by January 2005 to put passive RFD tags
on "the lowest possible part, case or pallet packaging. 10 7 Full-scale
deployment is now underway; DoD expects all 26 of its Defense
Distribution Centers to be ready to accept RFID-tagged product by the
end of 2007.108
The State Department has moved successfully to embed RFID in
passports. The United States was closely involved in the formulation
of an International Civil Aviation Organization committee
recommendation that all passports and other travel documents store
electronic data on "contactless integrated circuit" chips (which is to
say, RFID technology or a close relation). 10 9  The U.S. government
104 The U.S. General Services Administration mandates for the use of RFID to help it manage
information on the buildings, fleets of cars, and other products it oversees; see Sun
Microsystems, RFID Streamlines Processes, Saves Tax Dollars,
http://www.sun.com/br/government_1216/featurerfid.html (last visited Jan. 17,2007).
'05 See GAO, supra note 103, at 13-14.
106 See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text.
107 That is, suppliers should put tags on individual parts whenever possible; when item-level
tagging is impossible, they may tag cases instead; when they can do neither of those, they may
place tags on pallets. Matthew French, For DOD Logistics, Tags are It!, FED. COMPUTER
WEEK, Nov. 2, 2003, http://www.fcw.com/print/9_40/news/81316-i .html.
108 John Johnson, DOD Suppliers Will Start Tagging Product Soon, DC VELOCITY, June 7,
2006, http://www.dcvelocity.com/articles/rfidww/rfidww20060607/rfid_dod.cfin; Mary
Catherine O'Connor, DOD Grants ODIN $14.6 Million Contract, RFID J., May 25, 2006,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/2368.
109 See INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY ON MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS-THE ICAO BLUEPRINT (2003), http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal/fal12/
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then moved quickly to implement that recommendation. 110 New U.S.
passports now have RFID embedded."1 The passport electronically
stores the bearer's picture and the other information physically printed
on the passport.112 In response to pressure, the State Department has
incorporated some important privacy protections in its technology.
The passport cover incorporates shielding, so that the digital material
cannot be read when the cover is closed. Further, the digital
information on the passport is encrypted; the key is printed on the
passport and is gained by swiping the passport through an optical
reader." 3  Thus, the attacker is not supposed to be able to pull
unencrypted data from the card without physical access to it.
It is useful, from a security standpoint, to have encrypted digital
information on a passport: it makes it harder to forge passports or to
use stolen ones. It is another matter altogether, though, to make the
digital information on a passport available wirelessly.
Notwithstanding significant efforts on the State Department's part to
achieve a secure design for an RFID-enabled passport, there appear to
be significant security shortcomings in its passport design. For one
thing, the printed key is simply a combination of the passport number,
date of birth, and expiration date. If an attacker can learn or brute-
force that information, it can read-perhaps clone-the passport
data. 114 Moreover, the technology presents the risk that information
documentation/fa 12wp004_en.pdf; see also Letter from Privacy International et al., to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (Mar. 30, 2004),
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/icaoletter.pdf.
110 Time to Get a New USA Passport, http://hasbrouck.orgfblog/archives/000433.html (Oct.
14, 2004, 10:27 PST); Wilson P. Dizard III, Smart Passport Field Narrows to Four, GoV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Oct. 12, 2004, http://gcn.com/vollnol/daily-updates/27620-1.html.
11 Bruce Schneier, Fatal Flaw Weakens RFID Passports, WIRED, Nov. 3, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69453,00.html. Other countries have taken
similar steps. Japan, for example, has begun issuing RFID-enabled passports and will
dispense more than 3.55 million in the next year. Jonathan Collins, Japan Issues E-Passports,
RFID J., Mar. 28, 2006, http://wwwl.rfidjoumal.com/article/view/2224.
2 See Frank E. Moss, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Passport Servs., U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks to the Information Technology Association of America 4-5 (Mar. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.itaa.org/es/Frank%20Moss%2ORemarks.pdf.
113 Schneier, supra note 111.
14 Steve Boggan, Cracked It, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
idcards/story/0,,1950226,00.html; RFID enabled e-passport skimming proof of concept code
released, e-mail from Adam Laurie to the Bugtraq mailing list (Oct. 27, 2006, 17:35:43)
available at http://lists.openwall.net/bugtraq/2006/1O/27/24.
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broadcast by an open passport (potentially readable, even without
specialized equipment, as much as ten feet away and perhaps
fartherll1), even though encrypted, can still be used as a persistent
unique identifier of the person carrying it.116 That is, attackers may be
able to associate with each passport a string of data that is unique to it
and consistent over time; an attacker could use that information to
track the passport holder. 117 The State Department has introduced a
randomized unique ID feature that the agency says will mitigate this
attack, but it makes no claim that the feature will eliminate it.IT
The Department of Homeland Security is seeking to issue travel
documents that will present a different set of privacy and security
issues. DHS has sought to incorporate RFID technology into two
distinct sets of travel documents. The first is the PASS travel
document for people traveling by land between the U.S. and Canada.
A recently enacted U.S. law requires citizens to have passports to enter
this country from Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean; because it costs a
citizen nearly a hundred dollars toget a passport, the PASS card was
conceived as a cheaper alternative.I
DHS's current plans are to incorporate a 96-digit unique serial
number into each card, using EPC Gen2 technology essentially
115 The standard read range associated with the ISO 14443 chips used in passports is about
four inches, but in practice read ranges can be greater; the State Department has conceded as
much as ten feet in practice. See Bruce Stewart, Digging in to RFID, O'REILLY, Mar. 9, 2006,
http://www.oreillynet.com/conferences/blog/2006/03/diggingintorfid.html. See also Moss,
supra note 112 (reporting laboratory readers as far away as "a few feet"). Others have
claimed a read range of up to 69 feet, but it is not established that those observers were using
the ISO 14443 chip. NIST has reported readings of an ISO 14443 chip at thirty feet. See
Stewart, supra note 115.
116 Schneier, supra note 111. Activist Bill Scannell, in part for this reason, has referred to
RFID-equipped passports as "terrorist beacons." E-mail from Bill Scannell, disseminated by
David Farber on the IP list (Mar. 28, 2005), available at http://www.interesting-
people.org/archives/interesting-people/200503/msg00245.html.
.
17 See infra text following note 151; see also, RFID Passports at CFP,
http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/000558.html (Apr. 17, 2005, 12:30 PST) (quoting Bruce
Schneier's prediction that your unique passport ID number "will be sold to Choicepoint for a
dollar and added to your file the first time it is read").
118 See Moss, supra note 112, at 6; Press Release, Media Note, U.S. Dept. of State,
Department of State Begins Issuing Electronic Passports to the Public (Aug. 14, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/70433.htm.
'19 See Amendment Would Delay New U.S. Travel Card, CARD TECH., May 26, 2006,
http://www.cardtechnology.com/article.html?id=20060526I5ECSJNY.
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identical to that used on retail inventory control cards. 2 0 The serial
number, thus, would likely be broadcast promiscuously and could be
read under the right circumstances as far away as 25 to 40 feet, even if
the card itself were not displayed. The card would not incorporate
passport security features. The Department contemplates that travelers
approaching the border will remove their PASS cards from their
protective sleeves and place them on their car dashboards. About 30
feet before the border kiosk, they will pass under a portal containing a
card reader; the reader will extract the PASS card IDs and display the
associated information on a computer screen for the border control
official.12
This is problematic from a privacy and security standpoint. It
would not be difficult for third parties to pick up and track the unique
ID on the card.' 22 Without access to the DHS database, the attacker
could not learn the personal information associated with the card, but
they would easily be able to use the card's output as a persistent
unique identifier. Indeed, having done so, they could use that
information to clone the card-to program an inventory-control tag so
that it looks, electronically, like somebody else's PASS card. At that
point, it would be relatively easy to forge a PASS card for anybody
who looked somewhat like the tariet, and all of the electronic traces it
would leave would be the target's. 
3
The Department of Homeland Security also planned to embrace
RFID in connection with I-94s, the documents that all nonimmigrants
120 A public comment period relating to those plans ended on January 8, 2007. DHS has not
yet announced what actions it is taking in light of the comments it has received.
121 See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Proposes to Expand the Use of Vicinity
RFID in Implementing Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (Oct. 17, 2006),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_l 161114866740.shtm; Smart Card Alliance Identity
Council, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative PASS Card: Recommendations for Using
Secure Contactless Technology vs. RFID, SMART CARD ALLIANCE, June 2006,
http://www.smartcardalliance.org/alliance-activities/whti.cfn; Michael Arnone, Beaming
Across the Border: DHS and State Disagree on Which Security Technology to Use for Border
Protection, FCW.coM, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.fcw.com/article94156-04-24-06-Print.
122 While DHS plans to mitigate this threat by issuing travelers a plastic sleeve for their card,
travelers may not replace their cards in the sleeves promptly and some will surely lose the
sleeves altogether. See Smart Card Alliance Identity Council, supra note 121; Letter from
American Electronics Association et al., to Frank E. Moss, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of State, and Elaine Dezenski, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Border and Transp. Sec. Policy, U.S.
Dep't of State (Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.aeanet.org/GovernmentAffairs/
imVxLuTyjJJAdCYpdTbUqO.pdf#search=%22ruid%20epassport/ 0 22.
123 See sources cited supra note 114.
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(that is, noncitizens admitted into the U.S. other than for permanent
residence) must carry at all times. Congress has directed that the
agency use 1-94s to match up nonimmigrants' entry records with their
exit records; the problem is that while DHS creates and maintains
records when nonimmigrants enter the country, it has no similar
records created when they leave. Accordingly, the agency does not
know which nonimmigrants are in the country at any given time.
The Department of Homeland Security initially concluded that the
answer to this identification gap was for every visitor to carry, at all
times, an 1-94 equipped with an RFID chip similar to that
contemplated for the PASS card. The chip would contain a unique
serial number pointing to a database entry created at the border,
containing the traveler's biographic and biometric information. The
document would broadcast that unique serial number, promiscuously,
via RFID; DHS could read the tags at U.S. exit points without the
participation of the person carrying the document. 24  The serial
number could be read each time the visitor came within range of a
reader, whether DHS's or anyone else's. In the Department's words,
this would allow it to compile a "complete travel history" for each
visitor.' 25 DHS had a pilot program in place at five U.S. border ports
doing just that.
The program was the subject of vigorous criticism. As one critic
put the point, "this is the first case in which anyone in the USA (even
non-citizens), other than convicted criminals or those subject to
specific restrictive court orders issued following adversary and
evidentiary legal proceedings, will have been required by law to carry
remote radio tracking devices. 126  Privacy advocates urged that the
RFID tag serial number would both serve as a persistent unique
identifier and identify the carrier to anyone with an RFID reader as a
nonimmigrant visitor. 127  At the same time, technology experts
(perhaps providing some reassurance to the privacy advocates)
124 See id.; Letter from Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., to Chief Legal Counsel, Office of
Passport Policy Planning and Advisory Servs. (Apr. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfid_passports-0405.pdf#search=
%22passport%20%22contact%20technology/o22%22.
125 Update on RFID Passports and Traveller Tracking, http://www.hasbrouck.org/blog/
archives/000735.html (Aug. 19, 2005, 14:29 PST) (quoting DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE US-VISIT PROGRAM, at 14).
12 7 See Letter from Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 124.
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questioned whether agency REID devices would be able to read the tag
information on a sufficiently reliable basis.128
DHS now appears to have abandoned this project. 2 9 Read rates in
the pilot program were abysmal; at one test site, RFID readers
correctly identified only 14% of vehicles carrying a person holding an
RFID-enabled 1-94.l3° Moreover, it became clear that, to avoid
disabling signal interference, each site would need individually
designed equipment and infrastructure, to take into account each site's
individual "physical configuration of buildings, roadways, roofs,
gantries, poles and other surfaces against which the signals can
bounce."' 1  And because the program contemplated no biometric
examination of departing visitors (nor was any feasible, given current
resource and technological constraints), even perfectly working RFID
technology could confirm only that the 1-94 document was leaving the
country; it could not confirm that the person to whom the document
had been issued was along for the ride.13
2
A variety of other United States government RFID initiatives are in
the works. The Transportation Security Agency and Coast Guard are
planning a Transportation Worker Identification Credential program,
under which various workers in the transportation industry will be
required to apply for and receive RFID-enabled identification cards. 133
128 See Stewart, supra note 115. One RFID vendor, reacting to agency specs calling for 100%
read rates on tags inside vehicles as much as 25 feet away moving as fast as 55 mph, had
commented: "Yeah, and I think they believe in Tinker Bell, too." Evan Schuman, U.S.
Homeland Security Delays RFID Plan, EWEEK.COM, Feb. 28, 2006,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1931979,00.asp.
129 See Chertoff: RFID Program to Be Abandoned, UPI, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/TopNews/2007/02/09/chertoffrfid-program to-be aband
oned/7815.
130 GAO Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Homeland Sec. of the S.
Judiciary Comm., U.S. Senate: Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-378T, at 18 (Jan.
31, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07378t.pdf.
131 Id. at 18-19.
132 1d at 19.
133 See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) Prototype (Nov. 17, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press release 0558.shtm; Press Release, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., DHS Implements Immediate Measures to Secure Access to Ports (Apr. 25,
2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press release 0893.shtm; Letter from Randy
Vanderhoof, Executive Director of the Smart Card Alliance, to members and friends of the
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GSA is planning an RFID-enabled Personal Identity Verification card
for federal employees and contractors.' 34 DHS is looking at an RFID-
enabled First Responder Authentication Card for use in emergency
response coordination efforts among first responder categories within
federal, state, and local agencies. 135 All of these would comply with a
technology standard for Personal Identity Verification of Federal
Employees and Contractors (FIPS 20 1) promulgated by NIST. 136
Yet even as State Department, GSA, and DHS plans for
incorporating RFID into identity documents have gone forward, we are
seeing some backlash in this country against other comparable
government implementations. Two years ago, the state of Virginia
was exploring proposals for RFID-equipped driver licenses. 137 A year
ago, many analysts believed that DHS would mandate RFID for all
driver licenses under its REAL ID Act 3 8 authority. 139 The political
landscape, however, has now changed. State agencies have examined
RFID in the context of their driver license programs and found it
unsuited to their needs. 40 DHS's just-issued REAL ID rulemaking
proposal rejects RFID for driver licenses, writing that "there is not an
Alliance (May 2006), http://www.smartcardalliance.org/newsletter/may_2006/
letter_0506.html.
134 See NIST.gov, About Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and
Contracts, http://csrc.nist.gov/piv-program/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
About Personal Verification Project].
135 See Letter from Randy Vanderhoof, supra note 133.
136 See About Personal Identity Verification Project, supra note 134; see also SMART CARD
ALLIANCE, supra note 17.
137 Mark Baard, RFID Driver's Licenses Debated, WIRED, Oct. 6, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1 848,65243,00.html.
138 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, tit. II §§ 201-207, 119 Stat. 231, 311-16
(2005).
139 See, e.g., Posting of Bruce Schneier to Schneier on Security, Real ID,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/05/real-id.html (May 9, 2005, 09:06 PST).
140 See Thomas A. Schatz, Chip-Based Driver's Licenses Pose Enormous Problems, CIO, Feb.
2, 2006, http://www.cio.com/blogview.html?CID=17416. More recently, a house of the
California legislature voted preemptively to ban RFID in driver licenses. See Marisa Torrieri,
California RFID Bill Holds as Senator Considers Industry Concerns, INT'L BIOMETRIC INDUS.
ASS'N, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.ibia.org/biometrics/ industrynewsview.asp?id=384; see
also Anne Broache, Tech Industry Attacks State Anti-RFID Laws, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 19,
2006, http://news.com.com/Tech+industry+ attacks+state+anti-RFID+laws/2100-1028_3-
6062985.html.
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identifiable need for driver's licenses and identification cards to be
routinely read from a distance." It provides instead that driver licenses
must include information digitally encoded into a 2-D bar code.
14 1
Analysts have described this as an about-face prompted by increasing
public concern over the security, privacy, and monetary implications
of DHS's original plans. 142 As of this writing, two states have voted
not to comply with the REAL ID Act and similar bills have so far
passed one chamber of the legislatures of eight other states. 
143
In sum, the U.S. government's current record on deploying RFID
technology is mixed. RFID is now part of U.S. passports; as I will
explain in section VI, use of RFID technology there is undesirable and
ill-considered. DHS is pushing ahead to incorporate RFID into its
PASS cards, in an even more problematic move, and GSA is moving
to build the technology into a variety of government lDs. On the other
hand, our government is seeing some resistance. DHS has recognized
the technology's unsuitability for 1-94s and has recognized its political
unacceptability (at least for now) in driver licenses.
All this, however, is only part of the picture: the United States is
not the only country planning RFID initiatives. 144  In the People's
141 Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820, 10,837 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007) (to be
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 37), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nprmrealid.pdf at
75-76. The document discusses the possibility that state driver licenses incorporating RFID
could serve as PASS (border crossing) cards. Id. at 10,841-42, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nprmrealid.pdf at 92-94; see sources cited supra notes
119-23 and accompanying text.
'
42 Renee Boucher Ferguson, DHS Issues Proposed Regulations for Real ID Act, EWEEK.COM,
Mar. 2, 2007, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2100036,00.asp.
'43 See Real Nightmare, Status of Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States,
http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105 (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
144 Some time ago, both the European and Japanese central banks discussed incorporating
RFID tags in currency. See John Leyden, Japan Yensfor RFID Chips, THE REGISTER, July 30,
2003, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/07/30/japan.yens-for-rfid chips; Kim Yong-Young,
Radio ID Chips May Track Banknotes, CNET NEws.coM, May 22, 2003,
http://www.news.com/2100-1017_3-1009155.html; Junko Yoshida, Euro Bank Notes to
Embed RFID Chips by 2005, EE TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, http://www.eetimes.com/story/
OEG20011219S0016; but see Mark Roberti, The Money Trail, RFID J., Aug. 4, 2003,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/523/1/2 (such reports were "wildly
premature"). The U.S. government is said to have expressed interest as well. See Sun
Microsystems, Inc., RFID Streamlines Processes, Saves Tax Dollars,
http://www.sun.com/br/govemment_ 216/featurerfid.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). The
nominal goal here was to make counterfeiting more difficult, as well as perhaps keeping track
of money laundering and black-market transactions. Some reports indicated that tags for
currency would have a read range of only a few millimeters, so that information seekers could
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Republic of China, the government is issuing more than 1.3 billion
RFID "resident identification" cards, directly storing-and
broadcasting-personal identifying information including the holders'
names and birth dates. 4 5  A subset of those cards, as many as 150
million in the short term, will incorporate information relating to work
history, educational background, religion, ethnicity, police record,
medical insurance status, landlord's phone number, and personal
reproductive history (for enforcement of the "one child" policy). 146
The cards will not be able to be read from as great a distance as
DHS's; it appears that the tags' reliable range will be in the
neighborhood of a foot. But the fact that the entire population,
apparently, will be required to carry the RFID-equipped card,
identifying themselves wirelessly, without demand, is an order of
magnitude beyond anywhere DHS has gone so far.14 7
IV. ANALYZING RFID THREATS
It is hard to predict the future. Many RFID implementations are
still on the drawing board; we do not yet know which ones will
actually be rolled out. Tags may become entirely commonplace in
connection with some application I have not discussed in this
not identify currency from a distance, but details were hard to come by; the tag generally
discussed in this connection was Hitachi's p-chip, which is said to have a read range of about
a foot. See Hitachi Unveils Smallest RFID Chip, RFID J., Mar. 14, 2003,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/view/337/l/l. On privacy issues associated with RFID in
currency, see ARI JUELS & RAVIKANTH PAPPU, SQUEALING EuRos: PRIVACY PROTECTION IN
RFID-ENABLED BANKNOTES (2003), available at http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios
/ajuels/publications/euro/Euro.pdf.
145 See Sumner Lemon, China to Issue 1.3 Billion RFID Identification Cards, INFOWORLD,
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/03/o9/76259_HNchinarfidcards_l.html;
see also Ning Xiao, RFID in China, IDTECHEX, Aug. 30, 2006,
http://www.idtechex.com/products/en/articles/00000491.asp; National ID Project Moves
China to Head of the Pack in Radio Frequency Technology, CARDTECHNOLOGY, Feb. 21,
2007, http://www.cardtechnology.com/article.html?id=20070221PGYABPF5.
146 See Keith Bradsher, China Enacting a High-Tech Plan to Track People, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/business/worldbusiness/
12security.html?ei=5088&en=df3f7b36deO98bOO&ex=l 344571200.
147 Like U.S. passports, the tags will broadcast their holders' identifying information directly,
rather than just displaying a serial number pointing to a database entry. It is not immediately
clear what level of access control the card technology will support, and thus the extent to
which the information will be available to anyone with a reader, rather than just authorized
government agents.
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article. 14 8 It may be that all the barriers to item-level tagging of retail
goods will be overcome in the next fifteen years.
A few years ago, many of us paying attention to RFID were most
interested in commercial applications. Privacy scholars know the
importance of commercial privacy threats, given the industry's huge
ability and incentive to monetize information about potential
purchasers. Moreover, it was hard to ignore the science-fictional flair
of the notion of one's underwear broadcasting one's identity. But
commercial businesses will implement privacy-invasive (or any other)
technologies only to the extent they see return on investment. Further,
at least some commercial businesses are sensitive to public concerns
about RFID technology; no business can afford to be entirely
indifferent to those concerns. All this has somewhat restrained the
short-term commercial RFID privacy threat.
Government, by contrast, has different incentives and no market
constraints. Because government budgets are limited, even a
government agency has an incentive to accomplish tasks using less-
expensive technologies rather than more-expensive ones. But if
government decision-makers decide that a particular technology is
desirable, they can deploy it even where industry would see no return
on investment. And not all government entities are equally sensitive to
public privacy concerns. In contrast to the State Department, which
has tried to grapple with those concerns in good faith, DHS has
seemed less interested in treating privacy (and public perceptions of
privacy) as a high priority.
In this article, I will continue on the assumption that RFID
technology will ultimately become widespread, although not
necessarily pervasive, in some facets of everyday life-whether
government, commercial, or both. We need to consider, thus, how we
should think about that from a privacy standpoint.
This section of the article describes the characteristics of RFID that
generate privacy concerns. It goes on to describe three different
categories of RFID implementation that can present privacy threats:
first, one in which an RFID device makes available the holder's
personal identifying information; second, one in which the RFID
device provides a pointer to a limited-access database containing the
holder's personal identifying information; and third, one in which the
RFID device does not make available personally identifying
information (directly or through pointers to a database). For each
category, this article evaluates the extent to which use of the RFID
148 See infra note 205.
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technology presents one of three related categories of threat, which I
call surveillance, profiling, and action. The article pays specific
attention to the issues presented by inventory control tags, which as an
initial matter fall into the third category. There is reason to question,
though, whether the third category is robust: linking persistent
identifiers to personally identifying information may turn out to be
quite easy. Finally, this section of the article addresses the
significance of cryptographic access control as a means of addressing
RFID threats.
What specific characteristics of RFID give rise to privacy
concerns? First, RFID-equipped goods and documents may reveal
information about themselves, and hence about the people carrying
them, wirelessly, to people whom the subjects might not have chosen
to inform. If an ordinary citizen is carrying items or documents
equipped with passive RFID tags, then complete strangers can read
information from those tags without any current or prior relationship
with the person carrying them, indeed without having known anything
about that person at all before cranking up the tag reader. The subject
need not be aware that the information is being collected.
Second, that capability follows the target through space and reveals
to data collectors how the target moves through space. RFID presents
new privacy concerns in part because it allows observers to learn
something about a target that most other privacy-invasive technologies
do not-and that is where the subject is physically. It is thus, quite
directly, a surveillance technology. Finally, not only does the profile
that RFID technology helps construct information about where the
subject is and has been, but also RFID signifiers travel with the subject
in the physical world, conveying information to devices that otherwise
would not recognize it, and that can take actions based on that
information.
In evaluating these threats, it is important to distinguish among
different sorts of RFID implementations. We can start with an RFID
device that directly stores, and makes available to anyone with a
reader, the holders' personal identifying information. This would be
the category that the People's Republic of China resident identification
card described earlier would fall into, if it were adopted without
significant access controls preventing non-government actors from
reading the cards. 1
49
149 The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators standard for state driver
licenses requires that data digitally encoded onto a driver license be unencrypted. See
Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses, supra note 141, at 10,838. If a state chose to
implement RFID in connection with a AAMVA-compliant driver license, that information too
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This is the most obviously privacy-invasive scenario. Data on the
RFID tag can be read either by the entity responsible for the target
carrying the RFID tag, or by an unrelated (and unauthorized) third
party, and either way the person carrying the tag may not be aware of
the privacy invasion. The twenty-meter read range I referred to earlier
as a theoretical maximum for inexpensive passive tags leaves room for
substantial surveillance capabilities. Other tag implementations have
shorter read ranges, but readers can effectively invade privacy even
with shorter read ranges. One can embed an RFID reader, invisibly, in
floor tiles, carpeting, or a doorway. 150 A read range of only a few feet
is entirely adequate to track people coming through a door. So the
opportunities for surveillance are extensive.
This set of RFID implementations presents three related privacy
threats. The first is geographic surveillance. Any person with access
to a reader will know the identity of each person carrying a tag (and in
the PRC example just noted, all residents would be required to carry
one by law). The ability to read names off RFID tags, given that RFID
situates its data subjects in space, means that every reader network is a
Panopticon geolocator. A listener seeking to compile a database with
the identities of nearly all of the people attending an event in a
building would merely have to station readers at the building entrance.
The rest of the data collection and analysis would be automatic.
The second threat is profiling. The data collector can maintain a
profile on the target and include in that profile not only the results of
the surveillance, but also any other information gleaned at a distance
from the tag. In the case of a passport, this would include identifying
numbers, address, and physical characteristics. (Recall that the data
collector may be a third party, not the government entity that created
the tag in the first place.)
The third is the one Ravi Pappu describes as the "action threat.",
15
'
After learning a person's identity via RFID, people or devices
associated with the reader network can take actions regarding that
person (ranging from further surveillance and arrest on the one hand,
to displaying targeted ads on the other) based on their knowledge of
who the subject is and what it is like.
could be transmitted in the clear. It seems unlikely, though, that a state would make such a
choice in today's political environment.
50 CASPIAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.
15 1 RAVI PAPPU, THINGMAGIC, LLC, PRESENTATION AT THE RFID PRIVACY CONFERENCE:
PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE EPC NETWORK 11 (Nov. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.rfidprivacy.us/2003/papers/pappu.pdf.
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Next, let us consider an implementation in which RFID tags, while
providing no significant access control, do not broadcast personal
identifying information directly. Rather, they merely broadcast
pointers to entries in a limited-access database containing the holders'
personal identifying information. DHS's proposed PASS card is an
example of such an implementation. How does that change the
privacy calculus?
It does not change the calculus at all, of course, when it comes to
privacy threats from the entity responsible for the tag and in control of
the database. A U.S. citizen carrying a PASS card (at least so long as
the card is out of its protective sleeve), is still subject to surveillance,
profiling, and action threats from DHS, and from any other entity that
has obtained database access from DHS. A key question, thus, in
evaluating the nature of the privacy threat in such an implementation,
is the extent to which third parties can buy, barter, or otherwise gain
access to the database to which the tag points. To the extent that
governmental security-related information sharing is extensive today,
privacy threats associated with DHS RFID are accordingly greater.
To the extent that a third party cannot gain access to the database,
an important privacy-related concern remains: the data on the tag can
serve as a persistent unique identifier of the person carrying it.
Without knowing anything about the meaning of the serial number on
a particular tag, a person with a reader can use that serial number to
aggregate data about a particular subject over time-if only on the
level of "this is the same guy who was here making trouble last week."
The person carrying the tag is still subject to the surveillance,
profiling, and action threats, except that those threats will be directed
at the nameless (for now) holder of the particular unique tag, not at the
subject as a named person. Moreover, if the link between the tag
number and the subject's identity makes its way later into an
information broker's database, the privacy threats become identical to
those posed in our first scenario. I will return to that point later in this
discussion.
What if an RFID tag neither points to, nor carries, personal
identifying information? An item-level retail inventory control tag,
after all, does not contain the name or address of the person carrying it;
it merely points to a database entry revealing that it is, for example, a
sweater from a particular manufacturer, of a particular style and color,
with a given unique serial number. Where are the privacy threats
there?
To answer that question, it is useful to know at the outset the extent
to which third parties will know the meaning of those tag serial
numbers. Assume that an item-level inventory control tag conforms to
the EPCGlobal architecture. The system contemplated by the Auto-ID
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Center as a standard for RFID use in the retail supply chain,
establishing the Object Name Space ("ONS") as a distributed database,
is well-designed for easy and transparent access to tag data, by actors
up and down the supply chain, in the name of increased supply-chain
visibility and coordination. Initially, it appeared that the system might
be quite open. More recently, though, it has come to seem likely that
manufacturers will restrict access to portions of the ONS under their
own control, or avoid the ONS entirely, so that RFID scanning will not
reveal sensitive competitive information. 52 If a manufacturer restricts
access to portions of the ONS under its own control, then the
distributed database might inform the casual requester that the
Electronic Product Code ("EPC") on a particular tag referenced a
product made by shoe-manufacturer Mephisto, but that the rest of the
information referenced by the EPC was stored in a limited-access
database on Mephisto's servers. This will ameliorate some of the
privacy threat.
One should not take this point too far, though: the meaning of
common tag object classes, identifying the type and model of goods
supplied by a given manufacturer, may not stay secret long. Different
manufacturers' policies will vary; and as manufacturers embrace the
modem reality that they can monetize consumer information by selling
it to aggregators, it is by no means clear that the information
associated with tag data will remain closely held. It is at least
possible, therefore, that a tag on the shoe you purchase in the future
will tell anyone who asks, as you walk around town, that it is a
Mephisto shoe style 17, size 9, in black, serial # 139421386. In that
way, a wide range of strangers to you could learn, automatically and
without direct contact, the data on the tags you are wearing or
carrying, and could construct a snapshot profile of you.
That adds a new facet to the profiling threat. When I presented the
profiling threat earlier, it was fairly straightforward: a data collector
could enter in a profile, say, a person's address, lifted from his driver's
license or resident identification card. Item-level tags on retail goods
make this threat more interesting. Consumers might find themselves
carrying a variety of different tags on different occasions. Profiling
might incorporate data signaled by all of those tags-not (only) on
identification documents, but on clothing, vehicles, and portable
possessions. When an entity reads new information about the target
from a different tag or tags, it could add to the profile associated with
152 See STAPLETON-GRAY, supra note 68; FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 38
(testimony of Sue Hutchinson, Product Manager, EPCGlobal); id. at 222-23 (testimony of
Christopher Boone, Program Manager, IDC).
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that name any new characteristics associated with that new RFID
information (as well as the unique tag numbers themselves).
One might object that this is not much of a privacy threat because
information that readers will collect (such as the target's shoe style)
will likely be visible to the naked eye in any event. Yet RFID is
important from a privacy standpoint even where it only facilitates the
collection of information that could otherwise be collected by analog
means, by allowing for the automation of the information collection
and storage process.1 53  Imagine, after all, the movement of
automobiles down a highway. There is nothing stopping a government
from posting an employee to copy down license plate numbers or a
camera to photograph them. That information, though, comes into
being in analog format; it would be time-consuming and expensive to
enter it into a digital database. As a result, the information will not in
fact be entered digitally except on particular occasions when it is
important and cost-effective to do so. By contrast, if a reader were
positioned in the highway collecting data from RFID tags in
automobile tires (with the tag data linked to automobile VINs in a
separate database), then the collection of the data and its inclusion in a
searchable digital database would be fully automated, cheap, and easy
to do. RFID readers, in short, automate their information collection
and collect the information in a format that makes its inclusion in
networked databases trivial. That is important, because the cheaper it
is to collect, store, and analyze information, the more information will
in fact be collected, stored, and analyzed. 15
4
If RFID use becomes widespread, then various commercial and
governmental users are likely to deploy a wide range of discrete reader
networks. If there are economic and political incentives for the
proprietors of those various networks to share information (and there
are likely to be), then we will face the functional equivalent of a single
very large network. It will not matter if no particular set of readers is
pervasive.
55
153 See Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to
Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 29 (1995) ("If we direct our privacy-protection efforts at reinforcing our
doors and curtains, we may miss the way in which modem means of information collection
threaten our privacy by gathering up the pieces of our public lives and making them visible
from a single point.").
154 1owe this articulation to Lee Tien.
155 Moreover, "[ijt does not take a ubiquitous reader network to track objects or the people
associated with them. For example, automobiles traveling up and down Interstate 95 can be
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It is useful here to draw one last distinction. It has already become
clear from this discussion that while strangers can collect RFID data
from tags on goods or documents in my possession, that data is not
necessarily linked to my name or other personally identifying
information. 156 In some situations giving rise to information privacy
concerns, sensitive information is born already attached to the data
subject's name or other personally identifying information. Think,
say, of the information on driver licenses or passports, or credit-card
purchase information.
In some situations, thus, a data collector will draw a link between
my name (or other personally identifying information) and data on at
least one RFID tag I carry. If I go into the Gap and buy a tagged
sweater, then the Gap can link the sweater's EPC with my name and
other information in its database. Assuming that the tag is not disabled
at the point of sale or after, then every time I walk into the Gap
wearing that sweater, store personnel will be able to know who I am
without having to ask. If the Gap sells or trades the data linking my
tag information with my personally identifiable information, then
wherever I go anyone in possession of that data can read my tag and
accordingly know who I am, and my profile, without having to ask.157
In other situations, by contrast, RFID tag information, while attached
to the geographic location or the physical person of the target, will not
necessarily be attached to anyone's name or personally identifying
information. The data collector may know what type of sweater I
wear, but still may not know my name.
Where a target's tags themselves broadcast personally identifying
information or can be linked to such information, the target is subject
to a robust form of the profiling threat. A reader network can cheaply
tracked without placing RFID readers every few feet. They need only be positioned at the
entrance and exit ramps." CASPIAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
156 In another context, pseudonymous payment schemes seek to protect privacy by attacking
that link, decoupling purchase information from the buyer's identity. See Jonathan Weinberg,
Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1251,
1279-80 (2000).
157 The problem is reminiscent of that posed by a firm's linking computer users' cookie data
with their offline identities. At the time of the Abacus-Doubleclick merger in 1999, the
combined company announced plans to cross-reference Abacus's database of consumer buying
habits-containing real names and addresses and detailed buying information-with
Doubleclick's database of consumer Internet surfing and buying habits. It backed off in the
face of Federal Trade Commission and state investigations, private lawsuits, and a consumer
boycott. See id. at 1270. The analogy is imperfect, though, since consumers can avoid or
delete cookies with rather more ease than they may be able to avoid or disable RFID tags.
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and seamlessly collect RFID information from the target's belongings
and documents, and easily add it to its profile. When an entity reads
information from the subject's tags, it will be able to add to the profile
associated with its name any new characteristics associated with that
RFID information (as well as the unique tag numbers themselves).
The target is also subject to a strong form of the surveillance threat,
since the devices attached to the reader network will know who the
person carrying the tags is. Finally, the target is subject to an equally
strong form of the action threat.
Thus, for example, if my automobile windshield tag broadcasts a
unique ID corresponding to my account in the university parking
system, and that ID can be linked to my name, then any reader
network with access to that link will know where my car is (or at least
when it last came within range of a reader). The network can add that
information about my travels to my profile, together with information
derived from other RFID tags that appear in the same constellation,
although the software may need to do some work to figure the
likelihood that a particular tag is associated with some other person
traveling in my car. And the network can notify police, say, if they
have reason to want to talk to me when my car appears at particular
locations, so that they can have the conversation they want.
By contrast, where a target's tags do not themselves broadcast
personally identifying information (directly or through pointers to a
database the reader has access to), then a stranger who knows nothing
about the target other than what it can pull from its tags will not
necessarily be able to make a connection between the target's RFID
data and its name or other personally identifying information. This
largely eliminates the profiling and surveillance threats: if a stranger
reads my parking tag number but does not know which number is
whose, he will not know that this is my car.
The target is still subject to a version of the action threat, though.
Even without knowing the target's name, the listener can associate
information with the target's physical being in a particular location,
and take action based on that association-displaying particular
advertisements to the target, steering it to particular goods the seller
thinks may be of interest, offering the target differential rates,
imposing obstacles to its admission to a mall. 158 If my tag information
indicates that I wear a Rolex, a reader may not need to know my name
in order to decide to treat me differently. Further, the tag number can
158 See Kang & Cuff, supra note 12, at 106-07.
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serve as a unique and semi-persistent identifier.15 9 Anyone with an
RFID reader situated near a place I go can collect information over
time about me (the individual, located intermittently or long-term in a
particular geographic space, who is associated with particular unique
tag numbers). This information collection over time can inform the
actions I have just described. And once those dossiers exist, they may
be linked to my name at a later point.
Are these really separate scenarios? As profiling accelerates in the
modem world, aided by the automatic, networked collection of
information through technologies like RFID, information compiled by
one data collector likely will increasingly be available to others as
well; the economic (and homeland security) forces pushing in that
direction are powerful. As a result, information linking tag data to my
personal identity may well move easily into the hands of actors who
are strangers to me in any meaningful sense. 160  Linking persistent
identifiers to personally identifying information may turn out to be
quite easy. As John Gilmore has put the point, the fact that an RFID
payment tag provides persistent ID but does not broadcast the identity
of its carrier is only privacy-protective "once,"
until anyone who wants to correlates that token ID "blob" with
your photo on the security camera, your license plate number(and the RFIDs in each of your Michelin tires), the other
RFIDs you're carrying, your mobile phone number, the
driver's license they asked you to show, the shipping address
of the thing you just bought, and the big database on the
Internet where Equifax will turn a token ID into an SSN (or
vice verse) for 3c [sic] in bulk.161
That suggests that the privacy provided by tags (such as DHS's PASS
card) that broadcast only serial numbers pointing to database entries is
elusive; it may be all too easy for outsiders, such as information
brokers to link the unique serial number with the target's identity
sometime after its profile is created.
1591 will describe them here as semi-persistent, since, after all, if a tag is attached to a retail
good I am carrying, I may end up carrying or wearing the good only some of the time.
160 This suggests, though, that data privacy restrictions aimed at preventing the collection, or
sharing, of information linking tag data to personally identifying information may be one way
to limit privacy threats. See infra Section VI.
161 Posting of John Gilmore to Financial Cryptography,
https://financialcryptography.con/mt/archives/000552.html (Sept. 20, 2005, 10:29 EST).
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There is one more important set of RFID implementations for us to
consider. So far, I have discusses RFID implementations that
promiscuously broadcast tag data to third parties. That is not an
inherent characteristic of RFID technology. One can manufacture
RFID tags with sophisticated access controls, which will not release
their information unless the reader established through a cryptographic
handshake that the tags' programmer had authorized it.'6 That
technology is expensive, however, for a tag securely to authenticate an
authorized reader via public key cryptography is well beyond the
resources of the sort of low cost tag used in inventory control
applications.1 63  Nonetheless, if one is willing to pay for more
expensive tags, one can supplement cryptography with other technical
protections aimed at the ability of RFID tags to supply globally unique
identity. More sophisticated RFID architecture allows tags to emit not
a single, unchanging, unique ID, but a series of random pseudonyms,
which can only be understood by authorized verifiers. 164
There has been no movement by device manufacturers or standards
bodies to incorporate these approaches into ordinary inventory-control
tags and one would hardly expect there to be. The business case for
RFID in the retail supply chain depends on keeping the tags
inexpensive, yet firms can make RFID tags cheap only by making
them dumb. In order for a tag to implement access controls, it needs to
add logic gates, and that increases its size and cost. A manufacturer
cannot make a passive tag smart enough to handle, say, public-key
encryption, without completely blowing the business case for the
foreseeable future. So run-of-the-mine inexpensive passive tags, and
in particular those currently intended for use in the retail supply chain,
do not incorporate access controls, and disclose their data
promiscuously to anybody with a reader.
162e SANJAY E. SARMA ET AL., RFID SYSTEMS, SECURITY & PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS § 4.4
(2002), available at http://www.autoidlabs.org/uploads/media/MIT-AUTOID-WH-014.pdf;
see also ISTVAN VAJDA & LEVENTE BUTTYAN, LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS FOR
Low-COST RFID TAGS (2003), available at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/
events/ubicomp2003sec/papers/secubi03_p01 .pdf.
163 SARMA ET AL., supra note 162, § 4.3.
164 See U.S. Patent Application No. 20040222878 (filed Nov. 11, 2004), available at
http://appftl.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.html (search for "20040222878" and follow
the hyperlink for the application titled "Low-complexity cryptographic techniques for use with
radio frequency identification devices"); see also MIYAKO OHKUBO ET AL., CRYPTOGRAPHIC
APPROACH TO "PRIVACY-FRIENDLY" TAGS (2003), available at http://www.rfidprivacy.us/
2003/papers/ohkubo.pdf (changing tag data through a randomized hash chain).
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But some cards are more sophisticated. The Personal Identity
Verification card mentioned earlier, planned for identifying federal
employees and contractors, as well as the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential issued in prototype by the Transportation
Security Administration and the First Responder Authentication Card
being issued in DHS pilots will all use RFID chips meeting ISO 14443
smartcard specifications.165  Those cards incorporate more
sophisticated access control, designed to deny third parties the
opportunity to read the data on the cards. Do they ameliorate the
privacy threats discussed above?
It is surely the case that less availability of personal information to
third parties is better than more. As before, though, the security
against third-party eavesdropping does nothing to mitigate privacy
invasions by the card issuer. Moreover, even with more sophisticated
technology, security problems remain; recall the concern about
whether attackers can get persistent ID from passports using the ISO
14443 chip. At best, the more sophisticated technology presents an
arms race between RFID card designers and third parties seeking to
hack that technology. In the words of one informed analyst, "a
passport has a ten-year lifetime. It's sheer folly to believe the passport
security won't be hacked in that time."'
166
V. AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
(OR: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?)
The discussion so far indicates that widespread deployment of
RFID-enabled goods, credentials, or other items that move with
individuals through space may present an important set of privacy
threats, in particular (though not exclusively) in situations where the
tag data can be read by third parties. At this point, I think it is
important to devote at least a word or two to why we should view that
as a problem. I will not attempt a systematic justification of privacy as
a value, for that would demand a paper far longer than this one.
Privacy is "a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct
meanings" that it tends to defy rigorous analysis. 167 But a key aspect
165 See sources cited supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
166 Posting of Bruce Sclneier to Schneier on Security, Hackers Clone RFID Passports,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/hackerscloner.htm (Aug. 3, 2006, 15:45
PST).
167 Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
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of privacy, I will posit, rests in the nature of identity and social
relations in the world at large. Traditionally, we have created social
relations by deciding what information about ourselves we want to
disclose and to whom. Our various social relationships carry with
them varying norms governing what information we disclose to others
and how those others will safeguard the information we have
disclosed.168  We create concentric circles of intimacy by disclosing
more (or more sensitive) things to people we are closer to and fewer to
others. 169
Our ability to calibrate our disclosures in that way is precious. At
the outset, limiting disclosure about our private and social choices to
people within our circles of trust allows us to make those choices
without worry that they will be met with disapproval or ill-will from a
larger society. 170  More fundamentally, though, my being unable to
limit disclosure in that manner denies my ability to constitute and
define my own social relations with others. It forces me to treat
strangers as falling within one of my circles of trust or intimacy, as
having some bond of relationship with me, without regard to whether
that is something I would choose. My ability to disclose or withhold
information has social meaning: it demonstrates that I am the owner of
my own self and my own relationships. It attests that I am not
someone else's data, not a specimen belonging to those who would
investigate me.1
71
The profiling, surveillance, and action threats described in the
previous section put these values in jeopardy. When RFID tags
promiscuously broadcast a wide range of information about me to all
comers, facilitating the creation of a large-scale profile possibly tied to
my name, I lose my autonomy to decide for myself to whom I will
168 See Nissenbaum, supra note 12. On the social expectations attached to others' treatment of
information we have disclosed to them in particular commercial settings, see Jessica Litman,
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1304-11 (2000).
169 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,482-86 (1968); James Rachels, Why Privacy
is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 290 (Ferdinand D.
Schoeman ed. 1984); see also Philip E. Agre, The Market and the Net: Personal Boundaries
and the Future of Market Institutions (Oct. 6, 1998), http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/
boundaries.html.
170 See Reiman, supra note 153, at 35-36; Nissenbaum, supra note 12, at 148-49; Fried, supra
note 169, at 483-84.
171 The turns of phrase are from Reiman, supra note 153, at 39; see Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy,
Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976) ("Privacy is a social ritual by
means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred.").
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disclose that information. (That remains the case even where
particular individual elements of the profile are visually available to
strangers in public places; the danger lies, in part, in the cheap and
easy digital aggregation of all of the pieces of the puzzle that describes
me.) By locating me in space and impressing my digital profile on my
physical body, the technology magnifies the privacy threat. Inviting
strangers to take actions regarding me, based on my constellation of
tags, suppresses my ability to make my own choices in a zone of
"relative insulation.' ' 172
VI. POLICIES FOR NEAR-TERM RFID DEPLOYMENT
How-if at all-should regulators respond to the privacy threats I
have described? This section of the paper will discuss policies for
near-term RFID deployment. It first explains the undesirability of
incorporating RFID into either driver licenses or passports. It next
turns to the use of RFID in inventory control tags. The article
concludes that the EPC "kill command" is unlikely to be an effective
way of addressing privacy threats. Proposed data-privacy rules based
on fair information practice principles, while intelligent and coherent,
appear complicated and difficult to enforce; they too may be
ineffective. The article suggests a simple rule that inventory-control
REID tags attached to individual items in the retail sales chain be
clearly labeled and easily removable.
It is important to tread carefully before seeking to impose
regulatory limits on technology. Regulation can address the negative
social consequences of particular applications, but it may stifle the
advance of technological knowledge in a much broader field of
inquiry. Though networked sensors as a class, for example, surely
present privacy risks, 173 we would hardly be well-advised at this point
to dictate sweeping legal regulation of the design of sensor networks:
we do not know the potential costs of such regulation, nor are we well-
placed to do the line-drawing we would need.
In thinking about how best to cabin the risks presented by privacy-
invasive technology, thus, we run into what one might call the
Problem of Cool: how do we protect privacy without getting in the
172 The phrase is from Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1424 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Yong Xi et al., Preserving Source Location Privacy in Monitoring-Based
Wireless Sensor Networks (2006), available at
http://www.cs.wayne.edu/-weisong/papers/xi06-locationprivacy.pdf
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way of the "Really Cool" functionality that the technology might at
some point provide? This problem is both pervasive and intractable in
privacy law; you can see it in a wide variety of contexts. Wireless
location technologies have the potential for profound privacy invasion
(think Minority Report), but can also save my life when I call 911, find
me the nearest Starbuck's, and hook me up with any of my friends
who happen to be in the area. Web cookies allow Doubleclick to track
me from site to site, but greatly simplify the ordering process for
electronic commerce, and allow the tailoring of web content in
potentially Cool ways. Networked credit dossier databases may share
my personally identifying information with the world, but they also
enable, say, my instant mortgage approval.
In the United States, we most commonly try to address this issue
through an opt-out mechanism by giving (or saying we are giving)
users the opportunity to opt-out of privacy-invasive technologies if
they choose. I can turn off some of my phone's wireless location
features. I can reject cookies. The law encourages information
proprietors to maintain privacy policies, on the theory that this will
enable me to opt-out of transactions leading to my personally
identifiable information being included in networked databases,
available to third parties. All this is an attempt to protect privacy
without intrusively regulating technology. The approach does not
necessarily work especially well. Privacy policies, after all, are not
particularly successful in keeping personally identifiable information
out of networked databases. To the extent that a market-dominant
digital rights management system, say, presents privacy threats, it is
hardly clear that I can opt-out of it at reasonable cost.
Effective market power plays an important role in determining the
value of opt-out approaches. The availability of alternatives is one
reason why website proprietors rarely close their sites entirely to
visitors refusing cookies. By contrast, to the extent that privacy-
invasive digital rights management is built on Microsoft's Next-
Generation Secure Computing (formerly Palladium) architecture, it
will be the Wintel near-monopoly that enables that privacy invasion.
Credit card companies similarly have the market power to force
cardholders to abide by their privacy rules. These are the areas where
U.S. privacy law tends to present harder questions or simply fails. But
the opt-out approach tends to be U.S. law's first cut at the problem.
With that in mind, I want to examine some of the more specific
contexts in which RFID technology may present a privacy threat. Start
with government documents, because these are the easiest to analyze
from the perspective of opt-out: if our government requires RFID-
enabled passports (as it does), or RFID-enabled driver licenses (as it
currently does not), then no opt-out is meaningfully available. It is no
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answer to say that somebody who wishes to avoid the privacy
consequences of an RFID-enabled driver license need not get such a
license, or need not carry it on his person; that is not a realistic option.
The State Department designed its RFID-enabled passports with
relatively sophisticated protections against third-party access. Those
protections, though, are hardly the end of the analysis. These
documents incorporate personally identifying information and
broadcast that information directly to reader devices. The potential
they present for surveillance and tracking means that the wireless
availability of the information to authorized government readers,
without more, is worrisome from a privacy standpoint. And the
possibility of attack or interception by unauthorized readers, even if it
consists only of the interception of a persistent unique ID, is always
present.
A DHS advisory subcommittee last year issued a report urging that
the government not use RFID in connection with identification
documents. 174 RFID, the report argued, does not increase the speed or
efficiency of identification processes. The RFID transmission by
itself, after all, provides no assurance that the person holding an RFID-
equipped document is the person described in it. To get reliable
identification, a government verifier must compare biometric
identifiers on the document with the bearer's own characteristics-but
RFID provides little help in that process. On the other side of the
ledger, the report urged, the use of RFID for human identification
poses privacy and security risks out of proportion to its ordinary
benefits. 175
The Department's full advisory committee on Data Privacy and
Integrity, in its final report seven months later, softened its
subcommittee's language somewhat, backing away from its flat
statement that RFID should be disfavored for human identification.
The final report, though, still made it clear that RFID-identified human
identification systems did not provide clear efficiency benefits, and
posed multiple privacy and security risks. 176  It urged that RFID-
174 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE USE OF RFID FOR HUMAN IDENTIFICATION: A DRAFT
REPORT FROM THE DHS EMERGING APPLICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE V. 1.0
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacyadvcom
_rptrfid~draft.pdf.
175 id.
176 See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DATA PRIVACY & INTEGRITY ADVISORY COMM., REP. 2006-
02: THE USE OF RID FOR HUMAN IDENTITY VERIFICATION 4-6 (2006) [hereinafter DHS REP.
2006-02], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-advcom_1 2-
2006_rptRFID.pdf.
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enabled systems be deployed only where other technologies (such as
2-D barcodes contact-required smartcards, or magnetic strips) could
not do the job177; where data would be encrypted in tags, in transit, and
in the database, and the chip designed so that no two communication
sessions appeared alike178 ; where read ranges were no longer than
necessary to accomplish the objective 79; where there were adequate
protections against secondary use of the data and the information
would not be maintained longer than necessary to meet the objective
for which it was collected1 80 ; and where, absent legitimate reason for adifferent implementation, individuals had opportunity to opt-out and
there was a means to deactivate RFID functionality.' 81
These cautions seem entirely well-taken. The initial point-that
RFID, with its attendant privacy and security risks, not be deployed
absent powerful countervailing benefits-is perhaps the most
immediately salient. It is hardly clear why it is desirable for passports
to incorporate RFID. As the DHS committee noted, while the
inclusion of digitized and encrypted information on identification
documents provides important anti-forgery and anti-tampering
benefits, that does not mean that the information need be transmitted
wirelessly.182 Other forms of transmission, such as contact chips, 2-D
barcodes and optical memory stripe technology, are more secure and
less vulnerable to eavesdropping and skimming. 183  The relevant
International Civil Aviation Organization subcommittee (on which the
United States played an active and supportive role), it appears,
excluded contact chip technology for passports because there were no
established standards for fabricating passports with contact chips or for
reading them and because of fears that passports with contact chips
would be insufficiently durable. 184  But the privacy and security
177 id. at9.
178 Id. at 11.
179 Id. at9.
"
0 Id. at 9-11.
'
8 1 Id. at 9, 11.
182 id. at 6-7.
183 See Letter from the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 124.
184 See Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,553 (Oct. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R.
pt. 51) (Department of State final rule on electronic passports); Posting by Bruce Schneier to
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challenges RFID creates should have imposed a stronger presumption
that wireless technology is the wrong way to get digital information
from a passport to a government reader.
With respect to driver licenses, the key question is the same: absent
any good reason why driver licenses should incorporate RFID, and
given the inherent privacy risks, we need not worry about finding the
most privacy-friendly RFID implementation: RFID should not be in
driver licenses at all.' 85  And banning RFID from driver licenses
presents no meaningful risk of stifling important technological
development.
What about inventory control tags? As a starting point, RFID tags
on cases and pallets do not present any significant privacy threat. The
privacy threat from RFID in the retail supply chain comes when tags
are attached to consumer goods, on the item level; those tags leave the
store attached to the item, live and serialized; and the tags are not
discarded with the item's packaging. 
186
This sort of RFID implementation presents entirely different issues
from, say, the RFID-enabled passport. The information stored on an
inventory control tag, apart from its possible use as a persistent
identifier, is often not sensitive (perhaps, a pointer to a database
revealing that the tag is attached to a particular model and color of
sweater). Data security, on the other hand, is essentially nonexistent.
Some of the privacy threat here comes from the possibility that
individuals may find themselves, at one time or another, carrying a
Schneier on Security, Hackers Clone RFID Passports (quoting Randy Vanderhoof, Executive
Director, Smart Card Alliance), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/
hackersclone r.html#c99421 (Aug. 3, 2006, 15:45 PST).
185 See ACLU Testimony on Computer Chips in Virginia Drivers Licenses: Testimony Before
the Virginia Legislature on House Joint Resolution 162, Considering the Creation of Smart
Driver's Licenses (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/
Privacy.cfm?ID=16658&c=39 (testimony of Chris Calabrese, Program Counsel for ACLU's
Technology and Liberty Program).
186 See PAPPU, supra note 151. It is true that if manufacturers deploy item-level tags that do
not leave the store, consumers might still be subject to some sort of surveillance as they
interact with the tags inside the store. See id; CASPIAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 8-9. But I
see that threat as relatively minor. The technology in this context would not identify
customers, facilitate profiling, or enable any meaningful action threat, unless the store were
able to identify customers in some entirely separate manner, such as by taking pictures using
in-store cameras. Stores have in fact used RFID in conjunction with cameras in tests. See
Alorie Gilbert, Cutting-Edge 'Smart Shelf' Test Ends, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 22, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1008_3-5067253.html; Howard Wolinsky, P&G, Wal-Mart Store
Did Secret Test ofRFID, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 36 (but in those cases cameras
posed the main privacy threat, one not appreciably augmented by the use of RFID).
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variety of tags and thus at the center of a buzzing swarm of small
information transfers that can be aggregated into a much larger whole.
The remaining privacy threat comes from the possibility that, once a
unique ID on a tag is linked to an individual's personal identifying
information, the tag for surveillance purposes is equivalent to a device
transmitting the identifying information directly.
At the outset of the privacy debate over RFID in this context,
EPCGlobal (the trade body that stepped into the shoes of the Auto-ID
Center as the standards body for RFID in the retail sales chain) came
forward with an opt-out-based approach to privacy protection: the "kill
command." Under EPCGlobal's specifications, inexpensive passive
RFID tags are designed to respond to a password-protected command
directing the tag's integrated circuit to disable itself. Retailers thus can
choose to allow consumers to have RFID tags on their purchases
disabled before they leave the store. 1
87
There is appeal to the "kill command." The option of killing retail
tags at the point of sale recognizes the different tradeoffs the
technology presents at different points in the retail-goods' life cycle.
While goods are moving through the retail sales chain, RFID tagging
can offer important inventory-control benefits, with essentially no cost
in terms of consumer privacy. Once the good is sold to the consumer,
by contrast, there is no further need for inventory control. Moreover,
the approach EPCGlobal contemplates-that at the point of sale the
consumer would have the option to ask that a tag be disabled-allows
the consumer to maintain the functioning tag if it sees benefit in that
course.
EPCGlobal's approach, however, has the flaw all too often present
in opt-out solutions: it seems unlikely to do a very good job of actually
keeping live tags off the streets. It is by no means clear that
manufacturers (who will be the firms actually purchasing and affixing
tags in the retail sales chain) are interested in enabling the kill
capability. 188 More importantly, retailers are unlikely to want to incur
187 The kill functionality is also included in EPCGlobal's second-generation protocol
specification. See Rajendra Chaudhary, ISO Says Yes to EPC Gen2, CXOTODAY.COM, July
25, 2006, http://www.cxotoday.com/cxo/jsp/article.jsp?articleid=74813&catid=912.
188 It is not clear to what extent major manufacturers of retail goods were ever interested in
this kill functionality. According to one source, those users were split. Some were willing to
enable killable tags as an option for consumers; others, such as Nestle, were not. Those others
were unwilling to give up the potential functionality of tags that continue to operate past the
point of sale (facilitating returns and the like), and believed that privacy advocates represented
a minority who in the end would be unable to stop the technology's rollout. This Month's
Summary, RFID ANALYST 4-5 (April 2004) (RFID ANALYST was formerly SMART LABELS
ANALYST).
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the additional expense associated with allowing customers to kill tags.
Small retailers in particular, who may find it cheaper to continue
counting inventory by hand than to invest in smart shelves or a reader
network, will be reluctant to buy expensive equipment to disable the
RFID tags they 8will be receiving, uninvited, on their consumer
packaged goods.
Even if the law should require that consumers be offered a kill
option, consumers may not exercise that option if disabling the tag
requires more time at checkout or other inconvenience for the
consumer. That is all the more true if retailers or manufacturers offer
consumers any sort of incentive to forgo disabling their tags, such as a
more convenient return policy. Consumers tend to underestimate the
incremental impact on their privacy of allowing just one more set of
small disclosures, in part because they are not fully aware of the
degree to which any given disclosure can become part of an aggregate,
data-mined profile. Many will take the path of least resistance, not
bothering to opt out from the privacy-invasive default. Once a large
number of consumer goods with live EPC tags make it onto the streets,
we have to confront the fact that these tags, at least as currently
imagined, incorporate no useful privacy protections. As with
government documents, thus, opt-out does not provide a very
satisfactory answer.
Are there other solutions? A number of government and private
organizations have suggested best practices for inventory control
RFID. These tend to be based, in 1greater or lesser degree, on the fair
information practice principles' 9  that, though only sporadically
reflected in U.S. law, play an important role in U.S., as well as
189 See STAPLETON-GRAY, supra note 68.
190 See Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1072-74 (1999).
191 One good summary of Fair Information Practice principles can be found in the Federal
Trade Commission's 1998 Privacy Online: A Report to Congress: (1) consumers should get
notice of an entity's privacy policies before that entity collects any personal information from
them; (2) consumers should be able to choose whether to convey the information, and how it
can be used or transferred; (3) consumers should be able to see the information collected about
them, and to contest its accuracy or completeness; (4) the collector must take reasonable care
that the information it maintains is accurate and secure; (5) there must be some mechanism,
other than the data collector's good intentions, to bring about compliance. U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS III.A (1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.htm#Fair%2oInformation%2OPractice%2oPrinci
pies; see FTC RFID Workshop, supra note 20, at 275-76 (testimony of Cedric Laurant, Policy
Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
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European information privacy thinking. 192 Fair information practice
principles are not, in fact, obviously well-suited to data collection
systems like simple RFID. These principles work best in systems with
clearly identified data collectors, who have the information because
the consumer has voluntarily given it to them in order to facilitate
some transaction the consumer wants, and who are subject to
meaningful restraints on information reuse and sharing. But the
architecture of unsophisticated RFID systems allows anyone, including
persons entirely unrelated to the tag's manufacturer or its intended
users, to be a data collector. Reading is undetectable, and nothing will
cause the consumer to know that a reader is collecting data about him.
Data collection may be the basis of privacy threats even though the
information is never linked to the subject's name. 193 Fair information
practice principles work less well in systems in which devices reveal
information indiscriminately, so that there is no way to identify a class
of information collectors who can be made subject to the rules.
They are not completely inapposite, though. As I noted earlier, the
worst RFID privacy threats come when tag data can be linked to an
individual's name or other personal identifying information. 194 Fair
information practices can be used to address that linkage. A regulator,
or a set of industry best practices, might discourage entities operating
RFID technology from linking tag IDs to personally identifying
information. It might allow such linkage only in limited
circumstances, or request the data collector to disclose the fact and
purpose of the linkage to the individual involved and to obtain her
written consent. Further, it might forbid the data collector to disclose
that linkage to any unaffiliated third party. All of these suggestions
can be found in the Electronic Privacy Information Center's ("EPIC")
proposed guidelines for commercial use of RFID. 195 The EPIC
192 The first proposal for RFID privacy guidelines based on fair information practice
principles, to my knowledge, was SmISON GARFINKEL, ADOPTING FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES TO Low COST RFID SYSTEMS (2002), available at
http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/ 2002.UbicompRFID.pdf.
193 See PAMELA SAMUELSON, SENSOR NETWORKS & PRIVACY 8 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/Stanford%20cybpriv.ppt (slides presented at
Stanford Law School Symposium: Secuing Privacy in the Internet Age).
194 See sources cited supra notes 157-59 and the accompanying text.
195 See CtDRIC LAURANT & KENNETH FARRALL, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 17-18 (2004), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/fRc-comts-070904.pdf; see also FTC RFID Workshop, supra
note 20, at 205 (testimony of John Parkinson, Vice President and Chief Technologist,
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guidelines also seek to impose restrictions on tag data collection to
minimize the respects in which RFID makes fair information practice
principles problematic, by prohibiting the use of tag readers except
where individuals have been warned that they are present, and by
requiring that readers emit a tone or light, or some other easily
recomizable indicator, when they draw information from RFID
tags.r
A working group assembled by the Center for Democracy and
Technology, including a variety of industry actors such as Procter &
Gamble, Intel, Verisign, and Microsoft, developed a different set of
best practices, stating that consumers should be provided with notice
when information is collected through an RFID system and is linked,
or is intended by a commercial entity to become linked, to an
individual's personal information. The notice should specify why the
linked information is being collected and how it will be used;
consumers should be given the choice to refuse consent for uses other
than enabling the functioning or delivery of a purchased device or
contracted service, or facilitating the completion of the business
transaction. On the other hand, businesses need not give notice if, in
their "judicious discretion," they determine that the ease and likelihood
of linkage is sufficiently attenuated as to lower the privacy risk. 
197
The European Commission ("EC") has launched an ongoing
consultation on RFID policy, with a Communication from the
Commission expected in the spring of 2007.198 An earlier EC
Working Party published a document in 2005 and took the position
that existing European data protection law covers the collection of
RFID data whenever that information either contains personal
information or is reasonably likely to be linked to it.199 In those
Capgemini) ("Control of the object name servers and how you get to the intelligence that tells
you what [a tag ID] means should be the primary place to start applying policy.").
196 See LAURANT & FARRALL, supra note 195, at 17.
197 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CDT WORKING GROUP ON RFID: PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES
FOR DEPLOYMENT OF RFID TECHNOLOGY (May 1, 2006) (interim draft), available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20060501rfid-best-practices.php.
198 See RFID Consultation Website, http://www.rfidconsultation.eu/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2008).
199 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON DATA
PROTECTION ISSUES RELATED TO RFID TECHNOLOGY 8 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wpl 04en.pdf. It was
anticipated by a ruling by Portugal's National Data Protection Commission that RFID data
collection is subject to that nation's data privacy laws. See Portuguese Commission Rules
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situations, the report continues, data controllers are obligated to
comply with ordinary European data protection principles: data must
be used only for the purposes for which it was collected, not excessive
for that purpose, and kept no longer than necessary. In most
circumstances, it can be collected only on the basis of specific,
unambiguous informed consent. Data subjects must have notice of the
identity of the data collector and the purposes of the collection. They
must be told how to remove or disable RFID tags. And they must
have access to any information being kept about them.200
The EC working document notes that RFID technology may make
some of these limitations difficult to enforce. It may be difficult to
monitor the purposes for which linked data is used or even to know
which parties are maintaining data about a subject.201 The EC Working
Party thus concluded, as a general matter, that data subjects must have
notice of the presence of RFID tags and readers, as well as the
consequences of that presence in terms of information gathering.
20 2
I have to confess dissatisfaction, though, with these suggestions
and best practices guides. My dissatisfaction stems from two sources.
First, the various proposed rules tend to be complicated and difficult to
enforce. They will not, individually or together, necessarily be
effective at addressing the dangers presented by citizens' and
consumers' walking around with live, unsophisticated, serialized tags.
Second, I suspect that the "Cool" post-sale uses of item-level
inventory-control RFID tags will be few; manufacturers' reluctance to
RFID Use Subject to Country's Data Protection Law, 13 Telecomms. Monitor (BNA) (Jan.
22, 2004).
200 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 199, at 9-11. The RFID
privacy guidelines published by Ontario's Information and Privacy Commissioner similarly
focus on the link between tag data and personally identifying information. Following the
general outlines of fair information practices in other contexts, those guidelines provide that
organizations must seek individual consent prior to collecting, using, or disclosing personal
information linked to an RFID tag. They may link RFID data to personally identifiable
information covertly, indiscriminately, or through deception. They should collect no more
than the minimum information necessary to effectuate the purposes they have disclosed to the
consumer, and must destroy that information once it is no longer necessary to effectuate those
purposes. They should minimize the identifiability of any personal data linked to a tag,
minimize tags' vulnerability to reading by third parties, and minimize the linkability of
collected data to any personally identifiable information. Finally, they may not use, disclose,
or link to a consumer's personal information for any new purposes without the consumer's
consent.
201 See id. at 13.
202 See id. at 10.
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expose tag data to the world via the ONS will make it harder for third
parties to offer useful post-sale functionality. By contrast, if such tags
are widely deployed, the possible privacy-invasive uses of such tags
once goods are sold will be many-that is the direction that economic
incentives push in.
This suggests that we would do well to adopt a simple rule
requiring that inventory-control RFID tags attached to individual items
in the retail sales chain be clearly labeled and easily removable.
203
That should not pose an insuperable barrier for industry; EPCGlobal's
best practice guidelines for RFID tags on consumer products
"anticipate[] that for most products," tags will be "part of disposable
packaging or ...otherwise discardable." 204 Alternatively, retailers
could rely on technology like the IBM Clipped Tag.20 5 The Clipped
Tag is perforated. After purchasing a tagged item, a consumer can tear
the tag along the perforations to remove part of its antenna, reducing
its read range from tens of feet to a few inches. This provides an easy
and visible way of disabling most remote read capability, while still
preserving the serialized ID for uses such as returns (so that, say, a
consumer could return an item without proof-of-purchase by virtue of
the store's having associated the sale _rice and buyer's name with the
tag ID in its database at point of sale).
It is true that if manufacturers eschewed technology like the
Clipped Tag and simply made tags visible and easily removable, then
consumers would have to choose between privacy protection and post-
sale tag functionality. If a consumer discarded a tag, she would not get
the benefit of a retailer's use of RFID to facilitate returns. Recycling
centers would not be able to rely on EPCs to categorize recycled items.
Consumer items such as stoves and washing machines would not be
able to read tag information to get cooking or washing instructions.
20 7
203 See LAURANT & FARRALL, supra note 195, at 14; see also FTC RFID Workshop, supra note
20, at 190 (testimony of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse). This rule
would not apply if a tag were sophisticated enough to implement privacy protection, or if it
carried only a generic (not globally unique) identifier.
204 EPCGlobal, Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products, http://www.epcglobalinc.org/
public/ppscguide (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
205 See Ann Bednarz, IBM Demos RFID Tag with Privacy-Protecting Features, NETWORK
WORLD, May 1, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/050106-ibm-rfid-
privacy.html?fsrc=rss-rfid.
206 See id.
207 These uses are from ARi JUELS ET AL., THE BLOCKER TAG: SELECTIVE BLOCKING OF RFID
TAGS FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY 3 (2003), available at www.rsasecurity.con/rsalabs/staff/bios/
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Yet that result is not too distressing. Consumers would be able to
retain tags when they chose to.208 Manufacturers would remain free, if
they chose, to incorporate information more permanently into
consumer goods via a non-wireless bar code, or a generic tag not
carrying a globally unique identifier.
To be sure, the industry is not going to adopt my proposal, at least
not across the board. The Center for Democracy and Technology best
practices discussed earlier were developed with industry participation,
and they represent as much as the industry is willing to agree to on its
own. Those best practices are rather less restrictive than my
suggestion: they provide only that businesses, most of the time, ought
to allow consumers to decline consent for the business's linkage of
information it collects via RFID tags to the consumer's personally
identifiable information. But notwithstanding that my proposal will
not be adopted, it seems the simplest solution to the problem.
VII. RFID AND THE MORE DISTANT FUTURE
So far I have discussed two relatively concrete sets of RFID
implementations, either already deployed or plausible in the near
future, that we know a fair amount about. But what about broader
concerns? It is possible to imagine a world in which RFID technology
was so bound into the basic fabric of society that it would be
impossible to opt-out; Sterling's vision of a world shot through with
RFIDs and networked sensors, all leaving information trails and
microhistories of the objects to which they are attached, comes to
mind.2 °9
Even if one is not willing to be that speculative, government
documents and inventory control tags hardly exhaust the universe of
ajuels/publications/blocker/blocker.pdf Juels and his co-authors urge that the ONS
architecture should facilitate the use of "blocker tags," consumer-controlled devices that could
be programmed to prevent the detection of particular categories of tags in a consumer's
possession. All other things being equal, it would plainly be better for consumers to have
access to blocker tags than not. To the extent that the tags' availability would tend to relieve
any pressure to find other RFID privacy solutions, though, the emphatically opt-in nature of an
approach requiring that consumers maintain their own privacy protection devices is disturbing.
If consumer inertia would be a problem in connection with a right to disable tags at point of
sale, it would surely be a problem here.
208 For what it is worth, I imagine that retailers would likely take returns from consumers who
remove but retain their tags, just as they take returns from consumers who present analogous
documentation today.
209 See STERLING, supra note 1, at 12-13, 45-47, 97-105.
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RFID uses. The sort of RFID privacy threats I have discussed come
only from items people carry, but those items also include, say,
company credentials, student IDs, keys, credit and debit cards, parking
cards, and transit cards. All of these, if RFID-enabled, may present
privacy threats. For that matter, I have not discussed library books,
tagging of postal mail and luggage, or toll-booth payment cards. All
of these uses are either deployed or plausible. None have achieved a
commanding position in the marketplace, but that may just be a matter
of time. And with regard to all of these uses, the threats I identified in
Section IV are potentially important and salient.
I believe, indeed, that in the longer term we are sliding into a world
in which objects' wireless self-identification will become much more
routine and networked devices will be in a position routinely to collect
and process the resulting information, untouched by human hands.
That is not unequivocally a bad thing: increased use of wireless
technology will happen because that technology offers capabilities and
efficiencies unavailable without it. But the privacy consequences, for
all the reasons set out earlier in this article, may be profound.
The implementations I have described here are varied. We do not
know remotely enough about them to craft a one-size-fits-all response
that would make sense. It is here that the Problem of Cool is at its
most acute; regulation of such a large and poorly-defined class of
RFID uses poses an obvious danger of inadvertent suppression of
desirable technology. Should we do nothing, then? There are costs
associated with inaction, as well. As systems are deployed, they create
facts on the ground. As the deployment of privacy-invasive
technology makes us more accustomed to privacy invasions, those
privacy invasions come to seem more natural and reasonable. The
longer policymakers wait after such systems are deployed, the more
industry players have a vested stake in the technology already out
there and can point to regulation's disruption of reasonable
investment-backed expectations.
It is widely accepted in the privacy community, moreover, that the
best way to integrate privacy-invasive technologies into society is to
design privacy in from the start-to design the technological
implications with privacy in mind, rather than desiqning the
technology first and thinking about privacy only afterwards. 1 So the
time to be thinking about these issues is now.
210 See, e.g., DHSREP. 2006-02, supra note 176 ("[plrivacy and security must be built into the
full lifecycle of the RFID application from the outset-from the design stage, to deployment
and use, to end of life.").
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The privacy community, to date, has directed extensive advocacy
efforts at particular concrete RFID threats-most importantly, the
inclusion of RFID in government credentials and the penetration of
RFID-enabled inventory control tags into public space. They were
right to do so: those threats were the most immediately problematic
and had potentially huge scale. Scale is especially important in this
context, since, as I noted in Section IV of this article, the most
important RFID privacy dangers only come with scale. One of the
issues in Section IV was whether individuals equipped with various
RFED tags on their persons would really have to worry about tag
information being collected by a pervasive reader network; I answered
that as RFID implementations became widespread, leading a variety of
commercial and governmental users to deploy a large number of
smaller, discrete reader networks, economic and political incentives
for sharing of information among those networks would give us the
functional equivalent of a single very large network. 211 But the key to
that scenario is pervasive deployment of RFID technology; if it turns
out that we see only scattered deployment of occasional RFID
implementations, then we will get only scattered installation of
occasional RFID readers. So the largest-scale uses are especially
important.
We will see how events continue to unfold with regard to the
inclusion of RFID in government credentials and the penetration of
RFID-enabled inventory control tags into public space. In the
government sector, the key issue is the expansion of tagging beyond
the passport. The most immediate battleground is DHS's ongoing212
process regarding the design of its PASS card. In the retail sector,
we need to keep our eyes out for RED tags on individual high-value
retail items, where the tags are not designed to be conspicuous and
easily removable.
Those two areas, though, are not the only ones we need to think
about. On the contrary, our most important challenge right now is to
figure out where the rest of the universe of actual and potential RFID
implementations is heading. What sort of tags will be walking around
in the world of five and ten years from now? What information will
they contain and what security will they carry? If we can figure those
issues out, then the analysis set out earlier in this paper will help us
211 See CASPIAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 6 and accompanying text.
2 12 See sources cited supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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determine how to mitigate associated privacy threats. But the time to
work out those answers is now.
VIII. CONCLUSION
RFID deployment to date presents something of a paradox. On the
one hand, RFID is in many ways a tremendously powerful enabling
technology with a wide range of potential applications. On the other
hand, in the United States at least, the highest-volume applications
have not yet generated a business case suggesting the sort of return on
investment that would make the project worthwhile. That is most
notably true in the context of inventory control; the complexity and
cost of deployment, as well as the entrenched nature of existing bar-
code-based tracking systems, have left many firms unenthusiastic
about adopting the technology. In the end, I believe, we will find
ourselves moving in the direction of a world with pervasive RFID: a
world in which objects' wireless self-identification will become much
more nearly routine and networked devices will be in a position
routinely to collect and process the resulting information.
RFID-equipped goods and documents may reveal information
about themselves, and hence about the people carrying them,
wirelessly to people whom the subjects might not have chosen to
inform. That information leakage follows individuals through space
and reveals how they move through space. Not only does the profile
that RFID technology helps construct contain information about where
the subject is and has been, but RFID signifiers travel with the subject
in the physical world, conveying information to devices that otherwise
would not recognize her and that can take actions based on that
information. RFID implementations, thus, can present three related
privacy threats: geographic surveillance, profiling, and action.
RFID privacy consequences will differ in different
implementations. It would be a mistake to conclude that an RFID
implementation will pose no meaningful privacy threat because a tag
does not directly store personally identifiable information, instead
containing only a pointer to information contained in a separate
database. Aside from any privacy threats presented by the database
proprietor, privacy threats from third parties will depend on the extent
to which those third parties can buy, barter, or otherwise gain database
access. Moreover, even without database access, pointers present the
danger of the data on the tag serving as a persistent unique identifier of
the person carrying it.
Where a tag (such as an item-level retail inventory control tag)
neither points to nor carries personal identifying information, the
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extent of the privacy threat will depend in part on the degree to which
data collectors will be able to link tag numbers with personally
identifying information. Yet, as profiling accelerates in the modem
world, aided by the automatic, networked collection of information,
information compiled by one data collector will increasingly be
available to others as well; linking persistent identifiers to personally
identifying information may turn out to be easy. Nor are sophisticated
access controls and other cryptographic protections a complete answer
to RFID privacy threats. The cost of those protections will make them
impractical for many applications, though, and even with more
sophisticated technology, security problems will remain.
RFID on inventory control tags presents important societal
benefits. It is easy to exaggerate, though, the value of preserving the
capability to keep such tags live after the point of sale. Society would
be well served by a rule requiring that inventory-control, RFID tags
attached to individual items in the retail sales chain be clearly labeled
and easily removable.
Turning to the government document context: by virtue of the
serious privacy threats they pose, it is almost always undesirable for
government identity credentials to incorporate RFID. While the
inclusion of digitized and encrypted information on identification
documents does provide important anti-forgery and anti-tampering
benefits, that information need not be transmitted wirelessly.
What about company credentials, student IDs, keys, credit and
debit cards, parking cards, and transit cards? Library books, tagging of
postal mail and luggage, and toll-booth payment cards? These have
been less examined, but all of them, if RFID-enabled, may present
privacy threats. We need to figure out what to expect from the future
of RFID implementations: what sort of tags will be walking around in
the world of five and ten years from now; what information they will
they contain, and what security they will they carry. Those answers
are crucial if we are to be able to address the privacy threats that-
without careful and mindful design-RFID will pose.
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